Tag: Settlement Agreement

  • H. L. Brown v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 744 (1948): Taxability of Oil Royalties Acquired Through Settlement

    11 T.C. 744 (1948)

    Oil royalties received as part of a settlement agreement resolving disputes over an inherited estate are taxable income to the recipient, except for the portion of royalties that accrued before the agreement transferred ownership of the underlying land.

    Summary

    H.L. Brown contested a tax deficiency, arguing that oil royalties he received were exempt from taxation as property acquired by inheritance. The royalties stemmed from lands originally owned by his grandmother and later subject to a complex settlement agreement between family factions. The Tax Court ruled that while some of the royalties were indeed exempt as part of the inherited estate, those royalties accruing after the settlement agreement transferred ownership of the land to Brown were taxable income. The court reasoned that after the agreement, the royalties were no longer part of the inherited property but rather income derived from property Brown now owned.

    Facts

    Frances Ann Lutcher died in 1924, leaving a will that bequeathed $1,000,000 each to her daughters, Miriam and Carrie, with the residue of her estate to her grandson, Stark. Carrie was H.L. Brown’s mother. Stark did not promptly pay Carrie her bequest, leading to family disputes. Lutcher’s estate included lands leased to Sun Oil Co. Royalties from these lands were impounded due to the family disagreements. In 1943, the Brown and Stark families reached a settlement agreement. Under the agreement, the Brown family received cash, Texas lands, and Louisiana lands that were under lease to Sun Oil. The agreement also stipulated that the Brown family would receive the impounded royalties. After the agreement, Sun Oil paid out the impounded royalties, including $44,799.82 that had accrued before June 1, 1943, and $21,697.16 that accrued between June 1, 1943, and June 30, 1944.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a tax deficiency against H.L. Brown for the 1944 tax year, arguing that the oil royalties he received were taxable income. Brown contested this determination in the Tax Court. The Tax Court consolidated Brown’s case with his wife’s, Emily Wells Brown, as their income was community income. All issues were resolved except for the taxability of the royalty income.

    Issue(s)

    Whether oil royalties received by H.L. Brown from Sun Oil Co. in 1944, following a settlement agreement, are exempt from taxation under Section 22(b)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code as property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance.

    Holding

    No, because the portion of royalties accruing after the settlement agreement transferred ownership of the underlying land to the Brown interests is taxable income, not an inheritance. The court found that royalties accumulated prior to the agreement were acquired as a bequest and thus exempt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the key factor was the change in ownership of the land producing the royalties. Prior to the July 7, 1943, settlement agreement, the Louisiana lands belonged to the Lutcher estate. Thus, any royalties accruing up to that point were part of the inherited estate. The court quoted the settlement agreement: “It being the desire and intention to convey hereby all lands owned by the said Mrs. Frances A. Lutcher… together with all rents, royalties, revenues and incomes now due or to become due.” The court interpreted this to mean that after the agreement, the Brown interests owned the land and were entitled to the income it produced. The court cited Mertens Law of Federal Income Taxation, stating that a fiduciary is taxable on income retained by the fiduciary. After July 7, 1943, the Lutcher estate no longer retained the income from the Louisiana lands. The court acknowledged that certain legal formalities in Louisiana had to be completed to fully transfer possession, but those formalities did not change the fact that equitable ownership had passed to the Brown interests. Therefore, royalties accruing after July 7, 1943, were taxable income to the Browns, subject to depletion allowances. The court remanded to determine the exact amount of royalties accumulated after the signing of the agreement.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that the taxability of assets received as part of an inheritance can change depending on subsequent events and agreements. Specifically, it demonstrates that even if the initial source of funds is an inheritance, income derived from that property after a transfer of ownership is generally taxable. Attorneys should carefully examine settlement agreements involving inherited property to determine when ownership and control transfer, as this will impact the tax consequences for their clients. This case underscores the importance of considering not only the source of funds but also the timing of income accrual and the legal ownership of the underlying assets. Later cases applying this ruling would likely focus on precisely determining the date of ownership transfer in similar settlement contexts.

  • Catherine S. Thompson v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 601 (1947): Gift Tax and Transfers to Settle Claims

    Catherine S. Thompson v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 601 (1947)

    A transfer of property made to settle a legitimate, unliquidated claim is considered to be for adequate consideration and is not subject to gift tax, even if the transferor lacks donative intent.

    Summary

    Catherine S. Thompson transferred $120,000 in trust to settle a potential lawsuit threatened by her estranged daughter. The Commissioner argued that the transfer was subject to gift tax because it was for less than adequate consideration. The Tax Court held that the transfer was not a gift because it was made to settle a bona fide, unliquidated claim, and that the release from such a claim constitutes adequate consideration. The court emphasized that the transfer was a result of an arm’s length transaction to avoid costly litigation, and not motivated by donative intent.

    Facts

    Catherine S. Thompson had a strained relationship with her daughter. The daughter threatened to sue Thompson over certain claims. To avoid litigation, Thompson, on the advice of her attorneys, transferred $120,000 into a trust for the benefit of her daughter. Thompson’s attorneys believed the settlement was economically advantageous, given the potential cost and uncertainty of litigation. Thompson did not act out of love or affection for her daughter in making the transfer.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the $120,000 transfer was subject to gift tax. Thompson petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination. The Tax Court reviewed the case and rendered a decision in favor of Thompson.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a transfer of property to settle a threatened lawsuit constitutes a gift subject to gift tax when the transferor lacks donative intent and the transfer is considered economically advantageous.

    Holding

    No, because the transfer was made to settle a legitimate, unliquidated claim, and the release from such a claim constitutes adequate consideration for gift tax purposes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Thompson’s transfer was analogous to property settlements made by spouses prior to divorce, which are generally not considered gifts. The court relied on precedent such as Commissioner v. Converse, which held that transfers pursuant to settlement agreements are not gifts. The court also cited Commissioner v. Mesta, stating that “a man who spends money or gives property of a fixed value for an unliquidated claim is getting his money’s worth.” The court distinguished Commissioner v. Wemyss and Merrill v. Fahs, which involved antenuptial agreements, noting that those cases did not involve the settlement of existing claims. The court concluded that Thompson acted as one would in settling differences with a stranger, and that the transfer was not motivated by donative intent.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that transfers made to settle legitimate, unliquidated claims are generally not subject to gift tax, even in the absence of donative intent. Attorneys can advise clients that settling potential lawsuits with property transfers can be a tax-efficient strategy. This decision is important for estate planning and family law, as it provides guidance on the tax implications of settlement agreements. Later cases have cited Thompson to support the principle that transfers made in the ordinary course of business or to resolve bona fide disputes are not considered gifts, even if the value of the property transferred exceeds the value of the claim settled.

  • Beveridge v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 915 (1948): Transfer to Settle a Claim is Not a Gift

    10 T.C. 915 (1948)

    A transfer of property made to settle a legitimate, unliquidated claim is considered a transaction for adequate consideration, not a gift, for gift tax purposes.

    Summary

    Catherine Beveridge’s daughter, Abby, transferred valuable property to her mother before marrying against her mother’s wishes. After the marriage caused estrangement, Abby claimed the transfer was made under duress and demanded the property back, threatening a lawsuit. After negotiations, Catherine transferred $120,000 to a trust for Abby to settle the claim. The Tax Court held that this transfer was not a gift because it was made for full and adequate consideration (the release of the claim), and not out of donative intent.

    Facts

    In 1932, Catherine Beveridge gifted valuable real estate to her daughter, Abby. In 1934, Abby, intending to marry a German national against her mother’s wishes, reconveyed the real estate back to Catherine. Catherine vigorously opposed the marriage, and the subsequent marriage in 1935 led to a complete estrangement between mother and daughter.
    Catherine treated the property as her own, eventually transferring it to a trust for her son in 1941. In 1942, Abby, through an attorney, claimed the 1934 reconveyance was made under duress and demanded restitution, threatening a lawsuit if her demands were not met.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in Catherine Beveridge’s gift tax for 1943, arguing that the $120,000 transferred to the trust for her daughter was a gift. Beveridge challenged this determination in the Tax Court.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the transfer of $120,000 to a trust for the benefit of Beveridge’s daughter, made to settle the daughter’s claim of duress regarding a prior property transfer, constitutes a taxable gift under federal gift tax law.

    Holding

    No, because the transfer of $120,000 was made for adequate and full consideration in the form of a release from a legitimate, albeit unliquidated, claim, and not out of donative intent.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Tax Court reasoned that while the Commissioner argued no donative intent was needed based on Commissioner v. Wemyss, the critical factor was whether the transfer was for adequate and full consideration. The court emphasized that Beveridge’s actions were economically motivated and based on advice from her attorneys to settle a potentially costly and uncertain legal claim. The court found the situation analogous to property settlements in divorce cases, which are not considered gifts. The court cited Commissioner v. Mesta, noting that “a man who spends money or gives property of a fixed value for an unliquidated claim is getting his money’s worth.” The court distinguished Commissioner v. Wemyss and Merrill v. Fahs, as those cases involved antenuptial agreements, whereas this case involved the settlement of a contested claim. The court concluded that Beveridge was seeking to free her property from her daughter’s claims and gave what she considered a reasonable value for that release.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that transfers made to settle legitimate, unliquidated claims, even among family members, can be considered transactions for adequate consideration rather than gifts. Attorneys can use this case to advise clients that settlements of bona fide disputes, even if the exact value of the claim is uncertain, are generally not subject to gift tax. This ruling provides a basis for arguing against gift tax assessments in situations where a transferor receives a release from a claim or potential liability in exchange for property. Subsequent cases have cited Beveridge to support the proposition that a release of legal claims constitutes valuable consideration, impacting estate planning and dispute resolution strategies.

  • Seward v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 58 (1944): Tax Implications of Corporate Partial Liquidation

    Seward v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 58 (1944)

    A distribution of corporate assets in exchange for a portion of the shareholder’s stock constitutes a partial liquidation, the gains from which are recognized for tax purposes, even if the transaction arises from a settlement agreement and the corporation continues to exist.

    Summary

    The petitioner, Seward, received assets from Girard Realty Co. in exchange for her stock as part of a settlement with the other shareholders (the Austins). Seward argued this was a mere division of assets, not a partial liquidation, and thus should not be taxed as a short-term capital gain. The Tax Court held that despite the settlement context and Seward’s initial desire for a full liquidation, the transaction constituted a partial liquidation under Section 115(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, and the gains were taxable as such. The court emphasized that the final agreement between the parties clearly established a partial liquidation, superseding any prior intent for a complete one.

    Facts

    Girard Realty Co. held real estate. Seward owned half the stock; the Austins owned the other half. A dispute arose between Seward and the Austins, resulting in litigation. Initial settlement talks involved a complete liquidation and dissolution of Girard Realty Co. However, the Austins later changed their minds and wanted to keep the company in existence. A final settlement agreement was reached where Seward surrendered her shares for half the assets (land and money). The Austins retained their shares and the remaining assets within the corporation. The company continued to exist after the transaction.

    Procedural History

    Seward reported the transaction but argued it wasn’t a taxable partial liquidation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency. Seward petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the distribution of assets by Girard Realty Co. to Seward in exchange for her stock constituted a partial liquidation under Section 115(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, thus making the gain taxable as a short-term capital gain.

    Holding

    Yes, because the transaction met the definition of a partial liquidation under Section 115(i) of the Internal Revenue Code as it involved a distribution by a corporation in complete cancellation or redemption of a part of its stock.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court focused on the final agreement between Seward and the Austins, emphasizing that it established a partial liquidation. The court rejected Seward’s arguments that: (1) Section 115(c) only applied to disguised dividends; (2) the corporation was a mere “dummy”; and (3) the intent was merely to divide assets. The court stated that giving credence to these arguments would be akin to retroactively applying amendments to the law. The court cited Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, and refused to disregard the corporate entity of Girard Realty Co., as it had a history of legitimate business activity and was treated as a separate entity by all parties. The court noted that while the initial agreement contemplated a complete liquidation, the final agreement did not, and the parties knowingly entered into a partial liquidation. “A partial liquidation having occurred, the full amount of the petitioner’s recognizable gain thereon is to be taken into account in computing her net income.”

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that the form of a transaction matters for tax purposes, even if the underlying intent is a division of assets. Attorneys must carefully structure settlement agreements involving corporate assets to avoid unintended tax consequences. The case highlights that a partial liquidation will be recognized when a corporation distributes assets in exchange for its stock, even if the distribution arises from litigation or a settlement. Tax advisors must consider the potential for partial liquidation treatment whenever a shareholder receives assets from a corporation in exchange for their stock, particularly when the corporation continues to exist. Later cases would need to examine the specific details to determine if the distribution was ‘essentially equivalent to a dividend’ which would subject it to different tax treatment. The ruling emphasizes the importance of documenting the parties’ intent in the final agreement, as courts will primarily rely on the agreement’s terms when determining the tax consequences.

  • Estate of Dumont v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 158 (1944): Charitable Deduction Disallowed When Charity Acquires Bequest via Purchase, Not Will

    4 T.C. 158 (1944)

    A charitable deduction for estate tax purposes is disallowed where a charity acquires property not directly through a valid bequest in the decedent’s will, but through a settlement agreement involving a purchase of interests from the decedent’s heirs.

    Summary

    The estate of Frederick Dumont sought to deduct a bequest to Lafayette College as a charitable contribution for estate tax purposes. Dumont’s will, executed shortly before his death, contained a bequest to the college, but Pennsylvania law invalidated charitable bequests made within 30 days of death. Lafayette College challenged the will’s validity, and a settlement was reached where the decedent’s heirs sold their interests in the bequest to the college. The Tax Court held that the college acquired the property by purchase from the heirs, not by bequest from the decedent, and thus the charitable deduction was not allowable.

    Facts

    Frederick Dumont died on June 4, 1939, leaving a will executed on May 19, 1939. The will bequeathed the residue of his estate to a trust, with income payable to the president of Lafayette College for college purposes. An earlier will, executed more than 30 days before Dumont’s death, contained a similar provision. Because the 1939 will was executed within 30 days of Dumont’s death, Lafayette College’s bequest was void under Pennsylvania law. Lafayette College contested the probate of the 1939 will based on Dumont’s alleged lack of testamentary capacity.

    Procedural History

    The 1939 will was admitted to probate. Lafayette College appealed, contesting the will’s validity. A settlement agreement was reached between Lafayette College and Dumont’s heirs, wherein the heirs assigned their interest in the bequest to Lafayette College in exchange for consideration. The Orphans’ Court approved the agreement. The estate tax return included a deduction for the bequest to Lafayette College, which the Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed. The Tax Court reviewed the Commissioner’s disallowance.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the amount passing to Lafayette College qualified as a deductible charitable bequest under Section 812(d) of the Internal Revenue Code, given that the college acquired the interest through a settlement agreement rather than directly under a valid will provision?

    Holding

    No, because Lafayette College acquired the residue of Dumont’s property as a purchaser from the heirs and next of kin of the decedent, and not as a legatee under a valid bequest. Also, there was no valid disclaimer because the heirs received consideration for their assignment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Tax Court reasoned that for a bequest to be deductible under Section 812(d), it must be a direct act of the decedent. The court emphasized that Pennsylvania law governed the validity of the bequest. Under Pennsylvania law, bequests to charitable organizations made within 30 days of death are void. Therefore, the bequest to Lafayette College in the 1939 will was invalid from the outset. The court distinguished the case from Lyeth v. Hoey, where the Supreme Court held that amounts received in settlement of a will contest were acquired “by inheritance.” In this case, the court reasoned that Lafayette College did not acquire the property by inheritance or bequest, but through a purchase from the heirs. The court also rejected the argument that the settlement agreement constituted an irrevocable disclaimer because the heirs received consideration for their assignment, which negates a true disclaimer. The court cited In re Arnold’s Estate, stating, “From the earliest interpretation of the statute to the present time, we have uniformly held, as the act declares, that estates devised or bequeathed contrary to its provisions are void.”

    Practical Implications

    This case illustrates the importance of adhering to state laws regarding charitable bequests made close to the time of death. It clarifies that a charitable deduction will not be allowed if the charity’s interest is acquired through a purchase or settlement with the heirs, rather than through a valid bequest directly from the decedent. Attorneys advising clients on estate planning should be aware of these restrictions and ensure that charitable bequests are made well in advance of the testator’s death to avoid disallowance of the charitable deduction. It emphasizes that federal tax law looks to state law to determine the validity of a bequest. Later cases have cited Estate of Dumont to reinforce the principle that the substance of the transaction, rather than its form, controls for estate tax purposes.

  • Quigley v. Commissioner, 1943 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 154 (1943): Taxation of Settlement Payments in Lieu of Future Income

    1943 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 154

    A lump-sum payment received in exchange for the release of a right to future income from an estate is taxable as ordinary income, not as proceeds from the sale of a capital asset.

    Summary

    Charlotte Quigley contested her father’s will, which led to an agreement with her brothers for payments from their share of the estate’s income. In 1939, she received $20,000 in exchange for releasing her brothers from future obligations under that agreement. The Tax Court held that this $20,000 was taxable as ordinary income, as it was a substitute for future income, not a sale of a capital asset. The court distinguished this from a division of corpus, emphasizing that the payments represented a share of the estate’s income stream.

    Facts

    Herbert E. Bucklen died testate in 1917, leaving his estate in trust for his wife, two sons (Harley and Herbert), and daughter (Charlotte Quigley). Charlotte was dissatisfied with the will and threatened to contest it. To avoid a lawsuit, Charlotte entered an agreement with her brothers, Harley and Herbert, where they agreed to pay her a portion of their income from the estate to equalize her share. This agreement was executed from 1917 to 1939. In 1939, Charlotte received $10,000 from each brother, totaling $20,000, in exchange for releasing them from all future obligations under the 1917 agreement.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in Quigley’s income tax for 1939, including the $20,000 as taxable income. Quigley appealed to the Tax Court, arguing the $20,000 was either a non-taxable return of capital or should be treated as a capital gain.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the $20,000 received by Charlotte Quigley in exchange for releasing her brothers from future obligations under the 1917 agreement constituted ordinary income or proceeds from the sale of a capital asset.

    Holding

    No, the $20,000 constituted ordinary income because it was a substitute for future income payments from the estate, not a sale or exchange of a capital asset.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the $20,000 payment was a substitute for income Quigley would have received from her father’s estate under the 1917 agreement. Citing Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161 (1925), the court emphasized that income from an estate is generally taxable as ordinary income. The court distinguished Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188 (1938), noting that Lyeth involved a division of the estate’s corpus, whereas Quigley’s case involved a settlement for a stream of future income. The court stated, “The facts clearly show that the payments here in question, namely, the two $10,000- payments made to the petitioner by her brothers in 1939, were to be in lieu of income which she was to receive during her lifetime from her father’s estate.” Because the payments were a substitute for future income, they retained the character of ordinary income.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that settlements or lump-sum payments received in lieu of future income streams are generally taxed as ordinary income, even if the right to that income arose from a settlement agreement related to an inheritance dispute. Legal professionals should advise clients that such payments are unlikely to be treated as capital gains or tax-free returns of capital. Later cases applying this ruling focus on the nature of the underlying right being extinguished by the lump-sum payment, examining whether it represents a capital asset or simply a right to future income. This decision highlights the importance of carefully characterizing settlement agreements for tax purposes.

  • Erie Forge Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 242 (1941): Tax Implications of Debt Forgiveness and Income Realization

    Erie Forge Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 242 (1941)

    When a corporation’s debt is reduced through a settlement agreement rather than a gratuitous act of forgiveness, and the corporation previously sold assets related to that debt, the corporation realizes taxable income in the year the settlement occurs, to the extent the original sale price exceeded the ultimately determined cost.

    Summary

    Erie Forge Co. sold securities to Mrs. Till in 1929. Later, a lawsuit challenged the validity of this transaction. In 1935, a settlement agreement was reached, effectively reducing Erie Forge’s debt to Mrs. Till. The company had already sold the securities acquired from Mrs. Till. The Board of Tax Appeals addressed whether the debt reduction constituted a tax-free contribution to capital or taxable income. The Board held that because the debt reduction was part of a settlement, not a gratuitous forgiveness, and because Erie Forge had previously sold the securities, it realized taxable income in 1935 to the extent the original sale price of the securities exceeded their cost as determined by the settlement.

    Facts

    In 1929, Erie Forge Co. purchased securities from Mrs. Till for $650,000, with payment due in 20 years and interest at 5.5%. Mrs. Till was a shareholder. The transaction was intended to benefit Erie Forge by providing cash for stock and security dealings. Later, some preferred stockholders sued Erie Forge and Mrs. Till, claiming the agreement was ultra vires and violated the company’s articles of incorporation. In December 1933, Erie Forge returned some preferred shares to Mrs. Till, crediting the debt accordingly. In 1935, a settlement agreement was reached to resolve the lawsuit, effectively canceling the original 1929 agreement. Erie Forge had already sold most of the securities acquired from Mrs. Till.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a deficiency against Erie Forge Co. Erie Forge petitioned the Board of Tax Appeals for a redetermination. The Board of Tax Appeals reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the reduction of Erie Forge Co.’s debt to Mrs. Till, a shareholder, constituted a tax-free contribution to capital under Article 22(a)-14 of Regulations 86.
    2. Whether Erie Forge Co. realized taxable income in 1935 as a result of the settlement agreement, considering that it had previously sold the securities acquired from Mrs. Till.

    Holding

    1. No, because the debt reduction was part of a settlement agreement resolving a lawsuit, not a gratuitous act of forgiveness.
    2. Yes, because the ultimate fixing of the purchase price of the securities at an amount less than that at which they were sold, the sale having occurred in a prior year, brings the realization of gain therefrom into the year in which the price became fixed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Board reasoned that the settlement agreement was not a gratuitous act by Mrs. Till but a resolution of a bona fide legal dispute. The preferred stockholders’ lawsuit had colorable claims, and the settlement involved substantial consideration from all parties. The Board distinguished the situation from a simple forgiveness of debt. Because Erie Forge had already sold the securities, the ultimate fixing of the purchase price in 1935 resulted in a realized gain. The Board analogized the situation to short sales, where gain or loss is realized when the covering purchase fixes the cost. The gain was measured by the difference between the selling price of the securities in prior years and the ultimate purchase price as determined by the settlement agreement. The Board stated, “While the transaction here was not a short sale in one year with a covering purchase in a later year, the rescission or cancellation of the original agreement and the making of the new agreement which finally fixed and determined the purchase price presents a parallel situation and the gain measured by the difference between the selling price of the said stocks in the prior years and the ultimate purchase price could have been realized only when the purchase price was finally fixed.”

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that debt reductions resulting from settlements are not necessarily treated as tax-free contributions to capital, especially when the related assets have been sold. It highlights the importance of analyzing the substance of a transaction to determine its tax implications. The case establishes that when the cost of an asset becomes fixed after its sale, the gain or loss is realized in the year the cost is determined. This principle is particularly relevant in situations involving contingent purchase prices, rescissions, or settlements affecting prior transactions. Later cases might distinguish this ruling if the debt reduction is clearly a gratuitous act with no connection to a prior sale of assets or if the debt reduction occurs before the assets are sold.