Tag: Securities Dealer

  • Estate of Henry J. Richter v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 971 (1973): When Active Business Income is Classified as Passive Investment Income

    Estate of Henry J. Richter v. Commissioner, 59 T. C. 971 (1973)

    Income from sales of securities by a dealer can be classified as passive investment income under Section 1372(e)(5), even if derived from active business operations.

    Summary

    In Estate of Henry J. Richter v. Commissioner, the Tax Court addressed whether gains from securities trading by an active securities dealer, Richter & Co. , constituted passive investment income under Section 1372(e)(5), potentially terminating its subchapter S status. The court ruled that such gains were passive investment income, emphasizing the plain language of the statute over the nature of the business activity. This decision impacted the tax treatment of securities dealers and clarified the scope of passive investment income for subchapter S corporations.

    Facts

    Richter & Co. , a Missouri corporation, was engaged in the securities business, including trading, brokerage, and underwriting. It maintained an inventory of 50 to 100 over-the-counter securities and actively traded them. For its fiscal year ending October 31, 1966, more than 20% of its gross receipts were derived from profits on securities trading. Richter & Co. had elected to be taxed as a subchapter S corporation, and the issue was whether these profits constituted passive investment income, potentially terminating its subchapter S status.

    Procedural History

    The case originated with the Commissioner determining deficiencies in the federal income taxes of the shareholders of Richter & Co. for the years 1963 through 1967. The taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court, which heard the case and issued its opinion in 1973.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether gains from the sale of securities by an active securities dealer constitute passive investment income under Section 1372(e)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the plain language of Section 1372(e)(5) includes gains from sales or exchanges of stocks or securities in the definition of passive investment income, without distinguishing between active and passive business operations.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Tax Court focused on the statutory language of Section 1372(e)(5), which defines passive investment income to include gains from sales or exchanges of stocks or securities. The court rejected the argument that the income’s nature should be determined by the level of business activity involved, stating that “the standard used by the Code and the regulations does not permit us to look behind the normal characterizations of a corporation’s receipts in order to classify them as active or passive. ” The court also noted that the IRS regulations explicitly applied Section 1372(e)(5) to regular dealers in stocks and securities. The decision was influenced by the court’s prior ruling in Buhler Mortgage Co. , where similar income was classified as passive despite active business efforts. The court declined to follow the Fifth Circuit’s decision in House v. Commissioner, which had taken a different approach to the classification of interest income from small loan companies.

    Practical Implications

    This decision clarifies that for subchapter S corporations, the source of income rather than the nature of the business activity determines whether it is passive investment income. Securities dealers must be cautious that gains from trading, even if part of their regular business, can lead to the termination of subchapter S status if they exceed 20% of gross receipts. This ruling affects how securities dealers structure their businesses and manage their income to maintain subchapter S status. It also influenced later cases, such as I. J. Marshall, where the Tax Court reaffirmed its stance on passive investment income. Legal practitioners advising securities firms should consider this case when planning tax strategies and structuring corporate entities.

  • Schaeffer v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 304 (1947): Dealer vs. Investor Status for Securities

    Schaeffer v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 304 (1947)

    A securities dealer can hold some securities as capital assets for investment purposes while holding other similar securities as inventory for sale to customers, and the determination of which purpose controls depends on the specific facts and circumstances surrounding each security.

    Summary

    Schaeffer, a securities dealer, contested the Commissioner’s assessment of excess profits taxes for 1942-1945. The central issue was whether certain securities held by Schaeffer were capital assets, which would qualify for favorable tax treatment regarding dividends and capital gains. The Tax Court ruled that a dealer can hold securities for investment, distinct from inventory. The court analyzed each of the 36 disputed securities, scrutinizing how they were handled on Schaeffer’s books and whether they were segregated from securities held for sale to customers. The court’s holding hinged on whether Schaeffer demonstrated a clear intent to hold particular securities for investment rather than for sale in its ordinary course of business.

    Facts

    Schaeffer was a securities dealer. During 1942-1945, Schaeffer received dividends and realized gains from the sale of certain securities. Schaeffer maintained an “investment account” separate from its general inventory of securities held for sale to customers. Some securities were transferred into this account at different times, while others remained in general inventory. The company president testified that the investment account was created to avoid the mistaken sale of investment securities to customers. There was some ambiguity as to which securities were listed on position sheets as available for sale.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner determined deficiencies in Schaeffer’s excess profits taxes. Schaeffer petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of these deficiencies. The case turned on whether certain securities were “capital assets” under Section 117(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, affecting the computation of excess profits net income.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether dividends received on certain securities should be allowed as a credit in computing Schaeffer’s excess profits net income.
    2. Whether gains realized from sales and liquidating dividends of certain securities should be excluded in computing Schaeffer’s excess profits net income.
    3. Whether the Commissioner was authorized to adjust certain items on the tax returns to reflect the accrual basis of accounting.

    Holding

    1. Yes, in part, because some of the securities were held as capital assets for investment purposes during certain periods.
    2. Yes, in part, for the same reason as above.
    3. Yes, because Schaeffer used a hybrid accounting system, and the Commissioner has the authority to ensure the accounting method clearly reflects income.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied Section 117(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, defining “capital assets.” It emphasized that a securities dealer can hold securities for investment, citing E. Everett Van Tuyl, 12 T. C. 900, Carl Marks & Co., 12 T. C. 1196, and Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 13 T. C. 755. The critical factor was the *purpose* for which each security was held during the taxable years. Segregation of securities into a separate investment account was strong evidence of intent, but the lack of segregation was not conclusive. The court stated that “[a] dealer’s expressed intent to hold certain securities for purposes other than sale must be supported by conduct on his part in regard to such securities which is clearly consistent with that intent.” The court examined the company’s bookkeeping practices for each of the 36 securities. Regarding the accounting method, the court found Schaeffer used a hybrid system and that the Commissioner did not abuse his discretion in adjusting the returns to reflect an accrual basis. The court cited Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U. S. 92, noting, “The use of inventories, and the inclusion in the returns of accrual items of receipts and disbursements appearing on petitioner’s books, indicate the general and controlling character of the account…”

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on how to determine whether a securities dealer holds specific securities as capital assets for investment, entitling them to favorable tax treatment, or as inventory for sale to customers. It highlights the importance of segregation and consistent bookkeeping practices. The decision illustrates the Commissioner’s broad discretion to ensure a taxpayer’s accounting method clearly reflects income, especially when inventories are involved. Later cases have cited Schaeffer for the principle that a dealer’s intent, supported by consistent conduct, is crucial in determining the character of securities held. This ruling informs tax planning for securities firms and emphasizes the need for clear documentation of investment intent.

  • Van Tuyl v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 900 (1949): Capital Gains vs. Ordinary Income for Securities Dealers

    12 T.C. 900 (1949)

    A securities dealer can hold securities for investment purposes, in which case the securities are considered capital assets and the profit from their sale is taxed as a capital gain, rather than ordinary income.

    Summary

    Van Tuyl, a securities dealer, sold 900 shares of Wisconsin stock in 1945 and reported the profit as a capital gain. The IRS argued that the profit should be taxed as ordinary income because the stock was held as inventory for sale to customers. The Tax Court held that the shares were held for investment purposes, not for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, and therefore constituted capital assets. The court relied on evidence that the shares were segregated on the company’s books as an investment and were never offered for sale to customers.

    Facts

    Van Tuyl was a securities dealer.
    In 1945, Van Tuyl sold 900 shares of Wisconsin stock.
    Van Tuyl reported the profit from the sale as a capital gain.
    The IRS asserted the profit should be taxed as ordinary income.
    On January 3, 1945, Van Tuyl’s directors took action to correct book entries to reflect that 900 shares of Wisconsin stock was held as investment.
    Certificates for these shares were held by the bank, along with Van Tuyl’s other securities, as collateral for a loan.
    The shares were segregated in Van Tuyl’s books and were never offered for sale to Van Tuyl’s customers.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in Van Tuyl’s income tax.
    Van Tuyl petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination.
    The Tax Court reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the gain on the sale of 900 shares of Wisconsin stock in 1945 was ordinary income or a capital gain.

    Holding

    Yes, the gain on the sale of the stock was a capital gain because the shares were held as a long-term investment and constituted capital assets under Section 117(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court found that the evidence showed the petitioner acquired and held the shares as a long-term investment, rather than for trade in the regular course of its business.
    The court relied on the action taken by the petitioner’s directors on January 3, 1945, which showed that the petitioner’s officers regarded the 900 shares of Wisconsin stock as an investment. The corporate resolution was for the purpose of correcting the book entries to so show.
    The court also emphasized that the shares were segregated in the petitioner’s books and were never offered for sale to petitioner’s customers.
    The court cited I.T. 3891, C.B. 1948-1, p. 69: “Where securities are acquired and held by a dealer in securities solely for investment purposes, such securities will be recognized as capital assets, as defined in section 117 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code, even though such securities are of the same type or of a similar nature as those ordinarily sold to the dealer’s customers.”
    The court rejected the IRS’s argument that the petitioner should have inventoried the securities since it regularly used inventories in making its returns, noting that the investment shares were never properly included in inventory and were correctly taken out of inventory by the entry made January 3, 1945.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that securities dealers are not automatically required to treat all securities they own as inventory. It establishes that securities dealers can hold securities for investment purposes, and those securities can be treated as capital assets, leading to capital gains treatment upon their sale.
    To ensure capital gains treatment, securities dealers should clearly document their intent to hold securities for investment, segregate the securities on their books, and avoid offering them for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business. This case shows the importance of contemporaneous documentation in tax planning.
    This ruling has implications for securities dealers’ tax planning, allowing them to potentially lower their tax liability on profits from the sale of certain securities by classifying them as capital gains rather than ordinary income. Subsequent cases and IRS guidance have further refined the criteria for distinguishing between investment and inventory securities held by dealers.

  • Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 755 (1949): Capital Gains vs. Ordinary Income for Securities Dealers

    13 T.C. 755 (1949)

    A securities dealer can hold securities as a capital asset for investment purposes, and the profit from the sale of those securities is taxable as a capital gain rather than ordinary income, even if the dealer also sells similar securities to customers in the ordinary course of business.

    Summary

    Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., an investment banking firm, purchased shares of Wisconsin Hydro-Electric Co. stock. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that the profit from the sale of these shares should be taxed as ordinary income because Stifel was a securities dealer. Stifel contended that 900 of the shares were bought and held as an investment and should be taxed as a capital gain. The Tax Court held that the 900 shares were indeed a capital asset because Stifel demonstrated they were purchased as a long-term investment and not held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of its business. The court emphasized that a dealer can also be an investor.

    Facts

    • Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. is an investment banking firm engaged in buying, selling, and underwriting securities, and acting as a broker.
    • The firm purchased 1,000 shares of Wisconsin Hydro-Electric Co. preferred stock on August 18, 1944.
    • Prior to this purchase, the firm had been studying the stock as an investment proposition, learning about the company’s reorganization and potential acquisition.
    • The shares were initially recorded in the firm’s “Miscellaneous Stocks” account and included in its 1944 inventories.
    • On January 3, 1945, the board of directors authorized holding 900 of these shares as an investment, not for resale in the ordinary course of business. The remaining 100 were kept in the trading account for potential covering purchases.
    • These 900 shares were then segregated in a new account called “Wisconsin Hydro Elec. 6% Pfd. Inventory Acct.”
    • The firm did not offer these shares to its customers or include them in circulars.
    • In July 1945, Stifel sold 972 shares (including the 900) to F. J. Young & Co., who was seeking a large block of the stock.

    Procedural History

    • The Commissioner determined that the gain from the sale of all 972 shares was taxable as ordinary income.
    • Stifel conceded that the profit on 72 shares was ordinary income but argued that the profit on the 900 shares was a capital gain.
    • The Tax Court reviewed the Commissioner’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the gain from the sale of 900 shares of Wisconsin Hydro-Electric Co. stock was taxable as ordinary income or as a capital gain under Section 117(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Holding

    No, the gain from the sale of the 900 shares was taxable as a capital gain because the shares were held as a long-term investment and were therefore capital assets.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Tax Court reasoned that the evidence demonstrated Stifel intended to hold the 900 shares as a long-term investment. This was supported by the following:

    • Testimony from Stifel’s president that the shares were purchased for investment purposes.
    • The board of directors’ resolution to hold the shares as an investment.
    • The segregation of the shares into a separate account on the firm’s books.
    • The fact that the shares were never offered for sale to customers or included in the firm’s circulars.

    The court relied on the principle articulated in prior cases, such as E. Everett Van Tuyl, 12 T.C. 900, that a taxpayer may be a dealer as to some securities and an investor as to others. Quoting I.T. 3891, C.B. 1948-1, p. 69, the court stated that “Where securities are acquired and held by a dealer in securities solely for investment purposes, such securities will be recognized as capital assets…even though such securities are of the same type or of a similar nature as those ordinarily sold to the dealer’s customers.” The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the shares were held as stock in trade, finding no reason to discredit the testimony and evidence presented by Stifel.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies that securities dealers can hold securities for investment purposes, separate from their activities as dealers. To establish investment intent, dealers should:

    • Document the investment purpose at the time of purchase, preferably in board meeting minutes.
    • Segregate the securities in a separate account on the firm’s books.
    • Refrain from offering the securities for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business.

    This decision provides a framework for analyzing similar cases where the characterization of securities held by dealers is at issue. It demonstrates that the intent and actions of the taxpayer are critical in determining whether securities are held for investment or for sale to customers, regardless of the taxpayer’s primary business.

  • Van Tuyl v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 900 (1949): Distinguishing Capital Assets from Dealer Inventory

    12 T.C. 900 (1949)

    A securities dealer can hold securities as capital assets for investment purposes, distinct from their inventory held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, even if the securities are of the same type.

    Summary

    Van Tuyl & Abbe, a securities partnership, reported long-term capital gains from the sale of certain railroad bonds. The IRS reclassified these gains as ordinary income, arguing that the bonds were part of the firm’s dealer inventory. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the partnership, holding that the bonds were segregated and held for investment purposes, not for sale to customers. This case illustrates how securities dealers can hold assets for investment, differentiating them from assets held as inventory.

    Facts

    • The partnership purchased railroad bonds and certificates of deposit.
    • Partners testified these securities were bought for their own account, expecting a market rise.
    • These securities were initially entered in the regular trading ledger.
    • The firm then transferred them to a special account, identified them by number, fastened them together, and earmarked them to be held intact.
    • The firm maintained other ‘free securities’ as collateral, traded daily.
    • Only two sales were made of the segregated bonds: a small sale in 1943 and the bulk sale in 1944.

    Procedural History

    • The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in the petitioners’ income tax.
    • The petitioners contested the deficiency in the Tax Court.
    • The Tax Court reviewed the evidence and ruled in favor of the petitioners.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the railroad bonds sold by the partnership were capital assets as defined in Section 117(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, or were they property held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business?

    Holding

    1. Yes, the railroad bonds were capital assets because they were purchased for speculation, segregated from inventory, and not held primarily for sale to customers.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a taxpayer can be a dealer in some securities and an investor in others. The key is the purpose for which the securities are held. The court emphasized the evidence showing the securities were segregated, earmarked, and held for investment purposes, not for sale to customers. The court distinguished this case from Vance Lauderdale, where there was no evidence of a change in the operation of the business or in the method of handling the securities. Here, the segregation and earmarking of the bonds demonstrated a clear intent to hold them for investment. The court cited I.T. 3891, which states: “Where securities are acquired and held by a dealer in securities solely for investment purposes, such securities will be recognized as capital assets…even though such securities are of the same type or of a similar nature as those ordinarily sold to the dealer’s customers.” The court emphasized that “a taxpayer who trades for his own account does not sell to ‘customers.’” O. L. Burnett, 40 B. T. A. 605.

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance on distinguishing between securities held by dealers as inventory versus those held as capital assets for investment. To treat securities as capital assets, dealers must clearly segregate and earmark them, demonstrating an intent to hold them for investment rather than for sale to customers. This case clarifies that intent matters and that meticulous record-keeping supports a capital asset classification. Later cases have cited Van Tuyl to emphasize the importance of segregation and documentation in determining the character of securities held by dealers. This case also highlights the importance of consistent treatment of assets for tax purposes.

  • Van Tuyl v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 900 (1949): Distinguishing Investment Securities from Inventory for Capital Gains Treatment

    12 T.C. 900 (1949)

    A securities dealer can hold certain securities as capital assets for investment purposes, distinct from their inventory held for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, allowing profits from the sale of those investment securities to be treated as capital gains.

    Summary

    Van Tuyl & Abbe, a securities partnership, sought to treat profits from the sale of certain railroad bonds as long-term capital gains, while the Commissioner argued it was ordinary income because the partnership was a securities dealer. The Tax Court held that the profits were capital gains because the partnership had segregated specific securities, intending to hold them for investment and not primarily for sale to customers. This case highlights that a securities dealer can also be an investor, with different tax treatments applying to each activity. The key is demonstrating clear intent and actions to differentiate investment holdings from inventory.

    Facts

    Van Tuyl & Abbe was a partnership engaged in buying and selling securities. The partnership purchased Georgia Carolina & Northern Railroad bonds, some for retail customers and others speculatively, believing their price would increase over time. The partners consulted their accountant on how to designate certain bond holdings as investments. They segregated specific Georgia Carolina & Northern bonds, informing their bank to “freeze” these securities in a special account and not deliver them without further instruction.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in the petitioners’ income tax, arguing profits from the bond sales should be treated as ordinary income. The Tax Court reviewed the Commissioner’s determination, focusing on whether the securities qualified as capital assets under Section 117(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Issue(s)

    Whether profits from the sale of certain securities by a partnership engaged in the securities business should be taxed as ordinary income, as the Commissioner contended, or as long-term capital gains, as the petitioners contended.

    Holding

    Yes, the profits from the sale of the identified securities were capital gains because the securities were held as investments and not primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of the partnership’s business.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court relied on the definition of “capital assets” in section 117 (a) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which excludes “stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer… or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.” The court found the partnership had demonstrated an intent to hold specific securities for investment, distinct from its regular trading activities. Key factors included: the partners’ testimony regarding investment intent, the physical segregation of the securities, notification to the bank to “freeze” the securities, and the transfer of these assets to a separate special account. The court distinguished Vance Lauderdale, 9 T.C. 751 because in that case there was no actual change in how the securities were handled. Here, the actions of the partnership, including the segregation of the securities, demonstrated a clear intent to hold those specific bonds for speculation or investment. The court quoted I.T. 3891, stating, “Where securities are acquired and held by a dealer in securities solely for investment purposes, such securities will be recognized as capital assets…even though such securities are of the same type or of a similar nature as those ordinarily sold to the dealer’s customers.”

    Practical Implications

    This case provides a roadmap for securities dealers seeking capital gains treatment on certain holdings. The key takeaway is the need for clear segregation and documentation to demonstrate investment intent. Dealers should: Maintain separate accounts for investment securities. Physically segregate investment securities and clearly identify them. Document the intent to hold the securities for investment purposes (e.g., minutes, memos). Avoid treating investment securities in the same manner as inventory held for sale to customers. Later cases applying this ruling emphasize the importance of contemporaneous documentation of investment intent. The case clarifies that even if a firm is generally a dealer, it can still hold specific items as an investment if it can demonstrate clear separation and intent.

  • Hewitt v. Commissioner, 1947 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 19 (T.C. 1947): Inventory Method and Capital Gains Treatment

    1947 Tax Ct. Memo LEXIS 19 (T.C. 1947)

    A securities dealer who uses the inventory method of accounting must obtain permission from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue before changing to a different method; otherwise, securities held in inventory are not considered capital assets, and profits from their sale are taxed as ordinary income.

    Summary

    The petitioners, partners in a securities firm, sought to treat profits from the sale of certain securities as capital gains. The Tax Court ruled against them, holding that because the securities had been inventoried by the partnership and no permission was obtained from the Commissioner to change from the inventory method, the securities were not capital assets. The court emphasized that the partnership continued to operate and report as such, making the inventory method applicable and precluding capital gains treatment.

    Facts

    Hewitt and Lauderdale were partners in a securities business. They used the inventory method to account for their securities. In 1942, Hewitt entered military service, and Warne became a partner to represent Hewitt on the Stock Exchange. The new partnership (Hewitt, Lauderdale, and Warne) continued to deal in securities, including those previously dealt with by the original partnership. The securities from the “old partnership” were held in an account labeled “old accounts.” The petitioners sold some of these securities in 1943 and sought to treat the profits as capital gains.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the profits from the sale of the securities should be taxed as ordinary income, not capital gains. The taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination.

    Issue(s)

    Whether profits from the sale of securities, previously inventoried by a partnership, can be treated as capital gains when the partnership continues to operate and has not obtained permission from the Commissioner to change from the inventory method of accounting.

    Holding

    No, because the partnership continued to operate and report as such without obtaining permission to change from the inventory method, the securities remained part of the inventory and were not capital assets.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the burden was on the petitioners to show that the securities were not inventory assets. The evidence indicated that the “old partnership” continued to exist, even after the formation of the new partnership with Warne. Partnership returns were filed reflecting the income of both partnerships. The court stated, “The intention as to continuation of the old partnership is plain. It was not dissolved. Its property was not distributed.” Because the partnership did not secure permission to change from the inventory method, as required by regulations, the securities could not be considered capital assets. The court cited Internal Revenue Code sections 117(a)(1) and 22(c), as well as Regulations 111, section 29.22(c)-5, emphasizing that assets properly includible in inventory are not capital assets. The court distinguished Vaughan v. Commissioner, noting that in that case, the activity in the stocks passed from Vaughan to a newly formed partnership, whereas here, the same entity continued to buy and sell.

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the importance of adhering to accounting methods and obtaining proper authorization for changes. For securities dealers, it underscores the requirement to seek permission from the Commissioner before abandoning the inventory method. Failure to do so will result in the profits from the sale of securities being taxed as ordinary income rather than capital gains. The case also demonstrates that a mere intention to treat securities as investments is insufficient to overcome the statutory and regulatory requirements for changing accounting methods. Later cases will cite this to enforce consistent application of accounting methods unless explicit permission to change has been granted.

  • Hewitt v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1279 (1946): Inventory Method and Capital Gains for Securities Dealers

    6 T.C. 1279 (1946)

    A securities dealer who uses the inventory method of accounting must obtain permission from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue before changing to a non-inventory method to treat securities as capital assets.

    Summary

    Hewitt v. Commissioner addresses whether profits from the sale of securities by a partnership are taxable as ordinary income or capital gains. The Tax Court held that because the partnership had been dealing in securities, inventoried them, and did not obtain permission from the Commissioner to change from the inventory method, the securities were not capital assets when sold. The court emphasized the importance of consistent accounting methods and the requirement for prior approval to switch from inventory to a non-inventory method, rejecting the argument that the partners’ intent to treat the securities as investments was sufficient.

    Facts

    Petitioners Hewitt and Lauderdale were partners in a securities business. The partnership inventoried its securities. On June 30, 1942, Hewitt entered military service, and a new partnership agreement was formed including Warne. The new partnership continued dealing in securities, including those previously held by the old partnership. Securities held by the “old partnership” were maintained in an account labeled “old accounts.” Though some buying and selling occurred in this account, it was less extensive than the new partnership’s activities. These securities were not distributed to Hewitt and Lauderdale.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that profits from the sale of securities should be taxed as ordinary income. The taxpayers petitioned the Tax Court, arguing the securities should be treated as capital assets subject to capital gains rates. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner, upholding the ordinary income tax treatment.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the securities sold by the partnership in 1943 were capital assets, eligible for capital gains treatment, or were properly includable in inventory, making them subject to ordinary income tax rates.

    Holding

    No, because the partnership had been dealing in securities, inventoried them, and did not obtain permission from the Commissioner to change from the inventory method, the securities were not capital assets.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the securities remained the property of the partnership. The petitioners failed to demonstrate a dissolution of the old partnership. The court noted that partnership returns filed for 1942 and 1943 indicated a continuation of the original partnership, separate from the one including Warne. The court emphasized that the intention of the partners to treat the securities as investments was insufficient to override the requirement to obtain permission to change from the inventory method. The court stated: “A mere desire by the partners to regard certain securities as no longer inventory, but as investments, and themselves as no longer dealers, can not suffice to meet the statute.” The court cited the necessity of prior permission to change accounting methods, supporting its decision with Stokes v. Rothensies. The court concluded that the statutes and regulations mandated the stocks be treated as non-capital assets.

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the importance of adhering to established accounting methods, particularly the inventory method for securities dealers, unless explicit permission is obtained from the IRS to change. This decision clarifies that a taxpayer’s intent alone is not sufficient to reclassify assets from inventory to investments for tax purposes. It emphasizes the need for formal compliance with IRS regulations regarding changes in accounting methods. Later cases applying this ruling underscore the IRS’s authority to ensure consistent and accurate income reporting and the requirement for taxpayers to follow prescribed procedures when altering accounting practices.