Tag: Section 162(a)(2)

  • Bissonnette v. Comm’r, 127 T.C. 124 (2006): Deductibility of Meals and Incidental Expenses for ‘Away from Home’ Status

    Bissonnette v. Comm’r, 127 T. C. 124 (U. S. Tax Court 2006)

    In Bissonnette v. Comm’r, the U. S. Tax Court ruled that a ferryboat captain was entitled to deduct meals and incidental expenses (M&IE) incurred during layovers of 6-7 hours, as he was considered ‘away from home’ under IRS rules. The decision clarified the ‘sleep or rest rule’ for travel deductions, allowing full per diem rates for days worked, but subjecting them to a 50% limitation. This case is significant for defining the parameters of deductible travel expenses for transportation workers.

    Parties

    Marc G. Bissonnette and Lillian I. Cone, petitioners, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent. Bissonnette was the primary party involved in the dispute over the deductibility of his travel expenses.

    Facts

    Marc G. Bissonnette was employed as the director of marine operations and senior captain for Clipper Navigation, Inc. , operating ferryboats on Puget Sound. His workdays typically lasted 15-17 hours, consisting of turnaround voyages completed within 24 hours. During peak travel seasons, Bissonnette captained voyages to Friday Harbor and Victoria, B. C. , with layovers ranging from 30 minutes to over 5 hours. In the off-peak season, he captained the ferry to Victoria with a 6-7 hour layover. Bissonnette paid for his M&IE during these layovers and sought to deduct these expenses using the Federal per diem rates. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied these deductions, arguing Bissonnette was not ‘away from home’ under section 162(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency for the tax years 2001, 2002, and 2003, disallowing Bissonnette’s claimed deductions for M&IE. Bissonnette and Cone timely filed a petition with the U. S. Tax Court, contesting the Commissioner’s determination. The court considered whether Bissonnette was ‘away from home’ under section 162(a)(2), and if so, whether he should prorate his M&IE deductions and apply the 50% limitation under section 274(n).

    Issue(s)

    Whether Marc G. Bissonnette was ‘away from home’ within the meaning of section 162(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code during his turnaround voyages completed within 24 hours?

    Whether Bissonnette, if considered ‘away from home,’ must prorate and reduce his allowable M&IE for a partial day of travel?

    Whether Bissonnette, if considered ‘away from home,’ must further reduce his allowable M&IE by 50 percent pursuant to section 274(n) of the Internal Revenue Code?

    Rule(s) of Law

    Section 162(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code allows taxpayers to deduct travel expenses while away from home in the pursuit of a trade or business. The ‘sleep or rest rule’ articulated in Williams v. Patterson, 286 F. 2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961), states: “If the nature of the taxpayer’s employment is such that when away from home, during released time, it is reasonable for him to need and to obtain sleep or rest in order to meet the exigencies of his employment or the business demands of his employment, his expenditures (including incidental expenses, such as tips) for the purpose of obtaining sleep or rest are deductible traveling expenses under section 162(a)(2). ” Section 274(d) requires substantiation of travel expenses, but section 1. 274-5(g) and (j) of the Income Tax Regulations allow the use of Federal per diem rates in lieu of actual expense substantiation. Section 274(n)(1) limits the deduction for food and beverage expenses to 50% of the otherwise allowable amount.

    Holding

    The court held that Bissonnette was ‘away from home’ for purposes of section 162(a)(2) during the off-peak season voyages with 6-7 hour layovers in Victoria, as he needed sleep or rest to meet the exigencies of his employment. Bissonnette was allowed to use the full Federal M&IE rate for these days, without proration. However, the court ruled that his M&IE deductions were subject to the 50% limitation under section 274(n)(1).

    Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Bissonnette’s 15-17 hour workdays, responsibility for passenger safety, and the potential for extended travel times due to various factors justified his need for sleep or rest during the 6-7 hour layovers in Victoria. The court applied the ‘sleep or rest rule,’ finding that Bissonnette’s layover was of sufficient duration to relate to a significant increase in expenses, even though he did not incur lodging costs due to sleeping on the ferryboat. The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the layover was solely due to scheduling, focusing instead on Bissonnette’s need for rest. Regarding the proration of M&IE, the court found that Bissonnette’s consistent use of the full Federal M&IE rate was in accordance with reasonable business practice, as allowed under section 6. 04(2) of the relevant revenue procedures. However, the court upheld the application of the 50% limitation under section 274(n)(1), as Bissonnette’s M&IE were computed using the per diem method and did not qualify for any exceptions under section 274(n)(2).

    Disposition

    The court’s decision allowed Bissonnette to deduct M&IE at the full Federal per diem rate for the days he was away from home during the off-peak season, but subject to the 50% limitation under section 274(n)(1). The case was to be resolved under Rule 155 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.

    Significance/Impact

    Bissonnette v. Comm’r clarifies the application of the ‘sleep or rest rule’ to transportation workers, particularly those on turnaround voyages. The decision expands the understanding of what constitutes being ‘away from home’ for tax deduction purposes, focusing on the need for sleep or rest rather than the mere duration of absence from the home terminal. It also reinforces the IRS’s position on the use of Federal per diem rates for substantiation of M&IE and the applicability of the 50% limitation under section 274(n). This case has implications for other transportation industry employees seeking to deduct travel expenses and may influence future interpretations of ‘away from home’ status in tax law.

  • Gardin v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 1079 (1975): Determining ‘Home’ for Tax Purposes in Professional Sports

    Gardin v. Commissioner, 64 T. C. 1079 (1975)

    A professional athlete’s ‘home’ for tax purposes under section 162(a)(2) is at the franchise location where they are employed, not their personal residence.

    Summary

    Ronald L. Gardin, a professional football player, sought to deduct living expenses incurred at the franchise locations of the Baltimore Colts and New England Patriots as ‘away from home’ expenses. The Tax Court held that Gardin’s ‘home’ for tax purposes was the franchise location of his employment, not his personal residence in Tucson, Arizona. The court found that Gardin’s employment with the teams was sufficiently permanent to establish the franchise locations as his tax home, disallowing the deductions. This ruling clarified that professional athletes must establish their ‘home’ at their employment location for tax deduction purposes.

    Facts

    Ronald L. Gardin was a professional football player who signed contracts with the Baltimore Colts for the 1970, 1971, and 1972 seasons. He resided in Tucson, Arizona, where he had purchased a home. Gardin played for the Colts in 1970 and part of 1971 before being traded to the New England Patriots in September 1971. He incurred living expenses at the franchise locations of both teams, which he attempted to deduct as ‘away from home’ expenses under section 162(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in Gardin’s 1971 federal income taxes and disallowed the claimed deductions. Gardin petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. The court, in a decision by Judge Tannenwald, upheld the Commissioner’s disallowance of the deductions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Gardin’s living expenses at the franchise locations of the Baltimore Colts and New England Patriots were deductible under section 162(a)(2) as expenses incurred ‘away from home’?

    Holding

    1. No, because Gardin’s ‘home’ for tax purposes was at the franchise location of his employment, not his personal residence in Tucson.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Gardin’s employment with the Colts and Patriots was sufficiently permanent to establish the franchise locations as his tax home. The court emphasized that Gardin had multi-year contracts with the teams and that his employment did not have the ‘quality of impermanence’ necessary to classify it as temporary. The court cited previous cases, such as Wills v. Commissioner, to support its conclusion that a professional athlete’s tax home is typically at the franchise location. The court also noted that allowing deductions for living expenses at franchise locations would lead to an unintended result of most professional athletes being able to deduct such expenses.

    Practical Implications

    This decision established that professional athletes must treat their franchise location as their ‘home’ for tax purposes when seeking to deduct travel expenses under section 162(a)(2). Attorneys representing professional athletes should advise clients to establish their primary residence at the franchise location to maximize potential deductions. The ruling also impacts how similar cases involving other professional sports should be analyzed, focusing on the permanence of employment at the franchise location. Subsequent cases have applied this principle, reinforcing the notion that a professional athlete’s tax home is typically where their team is based.

  • Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 377 (1961): Deductibility of Expenses When Employment is Indefinite

    Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 37 T. C. 377 (1961)

    Expenses incurred while working away from home are not deductible if the employment is for an indefinite or substantial period of time.

    Summary

    In Peurifoy v. Commissioner, the Tax Court ruled that a taxpayer’s living expenses in Seattle were not deductible because his employment there was indefinite rather than temporary. The taxpayer, who was assigned to Boeing in Seattle for an indefinite period, sought to deduct his living expenses under Section 162(a)(2). The court, applying the temporary-indefinite test and the Harvey test from the Ninth Circuit, determined that the taxpayer’s assignment was not temporary, and thus, his expenses were not deductible. This decision underscores the importance of the duration and foreseeability of employment when determining the deductibility of living expenses.

    Facts

    The petitioner, assigned to work at Boeing in Seattle starting June 10, 1966, received a living allowance of $10 per day from GAC during the first six months of 1967, totaling $1,830. He included this amount in his reported income and sought to deduct it under Section 162(a)(2) as a business expense. The petitioner argued that his home was in Akron, Ohio, while the Commissioner contended that his home was in Seattle or Renton, Washington, where he was working.

    Procedural History

    The case was brought before the United States Tax Court, where the petitioner sought to deduct his living expenses. The Tax Court, applying its own temporary-indefinite test and the Ninth Circuit’s Harvey test, determined that the petitioner’s assignment to Boeing was indefinite and substantial, not temporary, and thus denied the deduction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the petitioner’s employment at Boeing was considered “temporary” under Section 162(a)(2) for the purpose of deducting living expenses?

    Holding

    1. No, because the petitioner’s assignment to Boeing was for an indefinite and substantial period, not temporary, under both the temporary-indefinite test and the Harvey test.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court applied the temporary-indefinite test, which distinguishes between temporary and indefinite employment periods. Employment is deemed indefinite if its termination cannot be foreseen within a fixed or reasonably short period. The court also considered the Ninth Circuit’s Harvey test, which states that an employee might change their tax home if there is a reasonable probability that they will be employed for a long period at the new station. In this case, the court found that the petitioner’s assignment to Boeing was indefinite and substantial, not temporary, as he knew there was a reasonable probability of long-term employment. The court cited John J. Harvey and Ronald D. Kroll to support its position. The court concluded that the petitioner’s living expenses were not deductible because he was not away from home in the context of Section 162(a)(2).

    Practical Implications

    This decision impacts how taxpayers and their advisors should approach the deductibility of living expenses when employment is for an indefinite or substantial period. It clarifies that only temporary assignments qualify for such deductions, emphasizing the need to evaluate the foreseeability and duration of employment. Practitioners must carefully assess whether a client’s work assignment is temporary or indefinite to determine the deductibility of living expenses. This ruling may influence business practices, particularly in industries with frequent relocations, encouraging employers to clearly define the expected duration of assignments. Subsequent cases like Doyle v. Commissioner have affirmed this approach, reinforcing the importance of this distinction in tax law.