Tag: I.R.C. sec. 7623(b)

  • Estate of Insinga v. Commissioner, 157 T.C. No. 8 (2021): Survival of Whistleblower Claims in Tax Court

    Estate of Insinga v. Commissioner, 157 T. C. No. 8 (2021)

    The U. S. Tax Court ruled that whistleblower claims survive the death of the whistleblower, allowing the estate to continue pursuing the claim. This decision clarifies that the court retains jurisdiction over whistleblower cases even after the petitioner’s death, ensuring that whistleblower awards can still be pursued posthumously.

    Parties

    Joseph A. Insinga, the original petitioner, filed a whistleblower claim against the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Upon Insinga’s death, his estate, represented by Amanda Gilmore as personal representative, sought substitution to continue the claim in the Tax Court.

    Facts

    Joseph A. Insinga filed a whistleblower claim with the IRS Whistleblower Office, naming multiple target taxpayers. The IRS denied the claim, leading Insinga to appeal to the U. S. Tax Court under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b)(4). At the time of his death in 2021, Insinga’s claim regarding two target taxpayers was still pending. His estate, through its appointed representative, moved to substitute the estate for Insinga to continue prosecuting the claim.

    Procedural History

    Insinga filed a petition in the Tax Court on April 25, 2013, challenging the IRS Whistleblower Office’s denial of his claim. The case progressed with cross-motions for partial summary judgment and motions to compel discovery. Insinga amended his petition in September 2017 to focus on two entities. Following his death, the estate filed a motion to substitute the estate as petitioner, which was not opposed by the Commissioner.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over a whistleblower’s petition filed pursuant to I. R. C. sec. 7623(b)(4) is extinguished by the death of the petitioner-whistleblower?

    Whether a whistleblower’s claim survives the death of the whistleblower?

    Whether the estate of a deceased whistleblower has standing to be substituted as petitioner?

    Rule(s) of Law

    I. R. C. sec. 7623(b)(4) grants the Tax Court jurisdiction over appeals of whistleblower award determinations. Federal common law presumes that rights of action under federal statutes survive a plaintiff’s death if the statute is remedial, not penal. The court applied a three-factor test to determine whether a statute is remedial or penal, examining the purpose of the statute, the recipient of recovery, and the proportionality of recovery to harm.

    Holding

    The Tax Court held that its jurisdiction over a whistleblower’s petition under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b)(4) is not extinguished by the death of the petitioner-whistleblower. The court further held that the whistleblower’s claim survives his death and that the estate has standing to be substituted as petitioner.

    Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the prerequisites for Tax Court jurisdiction in whistleblower cases were met with the issuance of a final determination by the IRS Whistleblower Office and the filing of a petition by the whistleblower. The court found no explicit statutory provision addressing the survival of whistleblower claims upon the death of the whistleblower, leading to the application of federal common law presumptions favoring survival of remedial claims. The court analyzed section 7623(b) using the three-factor test and concluded it served a remedial purpose by incentivizing whistleblowers and compensating them for potential harms, thereby ensuring the survival of the claim. The court also noted consistency with IRS regulatory guidance on substitution in administrative proceedings before the Whistleblower Office. The estate’s standing to pursue the claim was affirmed, aligning with precedents allowing estates to continue actions in federal courts.

    Disposition

    The Tax Court granted the motion to substitute the Estate of Joseph A. Insinga as petitioner and to change the case caption accordingly, allowing the estate to continue the whistleblower claim.

    Significance/Impact

    This decision establishes that whistleblower claims under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b) are not extinguished by the death of the whistleblower, ensuring that such claims can be pursued posthumously by the estate. It clarifies the Tax Court’s jurisdiction in these circumstances and reinforces the remedial nature of whistleblower awards, potentially encouraging more individuals to come forward with information about tax noncompliance. The ruling may impact how whistleblower claims are handled administratively and judicially, particularly in terms of estate planning and the administration of whistleblower awards.

  • Van Bemmelen v. Commissioner, 155 T.C. No. 4 (2020): Judicial Review of IRS Whistleblower Office Determinations

    Van Bemmelen v. Commissioner, 155 T. C. No. 4 (2020)

    In Van Bemmelen v. Commissioner, the U. S. Tax Court upheld the IRS Whistleblower Office’s (WBO) rejection of Michael Van Bemmelen’s claim for an award under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b). The court found the WBO’s decision to be supported by the administrative record and not an abuse of discretion. Van Bemmelen alleged tax evasion by a global insurance company but failed to provide specific, credible information. The ruling reinforces the IRS’s broad discretion in handling whistleblower claims and clarifies the scope of judicial review in such cases.

    Parties

    Michael Van Bemmelen, as the petitioner, sought review of the IRS Whistleblower Office’s determination to reject his claim for a whistleblower award. The respondent was the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Throughout the litigation, Van Bemmelen represented himself pro se, while the Commissioner was represented by Nicole M. Connelly.

    Facts

    In March 2018, Michael Van Bemmelen, through his attorney Linda J. Stengle, submitted a Form 211 to the IRS Whistleblower Office (WBO), alleging tax violations by a global insurance company (the target). Van Bemmelen’s claim referenced an earlier submission from 2012, which related to the target and other taxpayers. The 2018 Form 211 included a narrative asserting the target’s involvement in a tax evasion scheme involving investments in life insurance policies and money laundering. Van Bemmelen alleged that the target improperly deducted interest on borrowed funds used to finance these investments, resulting in significant tax underpayments. The WBO forwarded the claim to a classifier in the Large Business & International Division (LB&I), who recommended rejection due to the speculative nature of the allegations and lack of specific, credible information. On September 11, 2018, the WBO issued a final determination rejecting Van Bemmelen’s claim under I. R. C. sec. 7623(a).

    Procedural History

    After the WBO’s rejection, Van Bemmelen timely petitioned the U. S. Tax Court for review. The Commissioner moved for summary judgment, supported by declarations from the LB&I classifier and an employee in the WBO’s Initial Claim Evaluation Unit. Van Bemmelen moved to supplement the administrative record with his 2012 submission and a 2019 document reflecting a presentation to IRS Criminal Investigation Division agents. The Tax Court granted the motion to supplement the record with the 2012 submission but denied it regarding the 2019 document. The court reviewed the case under the Administrative Procedure Act’s standard of review, focusing on whether the WBO’s action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the IRS Whistleblower Office abused its discretion in rejecting Michael Van Bemmelen’s claim for a whistleblower award under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b) on the grounds that the information provided was speculative and/or did not provide specific or credible information regarding tax underpayments or violations of internal revenue laws?

    Rule(s) of Law

    The Tax Court’s review of the WBO’s determination is governed by the standard of review under section 706(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which requires the court to reverse agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. ” I. R. C. sec. 7623(b) mandates whistleblower awards if certain statutory requirements are met, including that the proceeds in dispute exceed $2 million. The WBO may reject claims that fail to meet threshold criteria, such as containing specific, credible information about tax underpayments or violations of internal revenue laws. The WBO has sole discretion to request additional assistance from the whistleblower or their legal representative.

    Holding

    The Tax Court held that the IRS Whistleblower Office did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Michael Van Bemmelen’s claim for a whistleblower award. The court found that the WBO’s determination was supported by the administrative record and that the allegations in Van Bemmelen’s claim were speculative and lacked specific, credible information regarding tax underpayments or violations of internal revenue laws by the target.

    Reasoning

    The court’s reasoning focused on the WBO’s discretion to reject claims that fail to meet statutory and regulatory criteria. The court analyzed the information provided by Van Bemmelen and found it to be speculative, particularly with respect to the target’s alleged involvement in money laundering and improper interest deductions. The court noted that the 2012 submission, which was added to the administrative record, did not contain specific allegations against the target that would have affected the WBO’s analysis. The court also considered the WBO’s discretion to limit the scope of investigations and its authority to reject claims without further investigation if they do not meet threshold requirements. The court rejected Van Bemmelen’s arguments about procedural irregularities and the WBO Director’s alleged improper redelegation of authority, finding no merit in these claims. The court emphasized that it could not compel the IRS to commence an audit or explain its decision not to do so, and that the WBO’s rejection of Van Bemmelen’s claim was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

    Disposition

    The Tax Court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment, affirming the WBO’s rejection of Van Bemmelen’s claim for a whistleblower award.

    Significance/Impact

    The Van Bemmelen decision reinforces the broad discretion afforded to the IRS Whistleblower Office in evaluating and rejecting whistleblower claims. It clarifies that the Tax Court’s review is limited to determining whether the WBO’s action was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and that the court cannot compel the IRS to commence an audit or explain its decision not to do so. The case also highlights the importance of providing specific, credible information in whistleblower claims to meet the threshold criteria for further consideration. Subsequent courts have cited Van Bemmelen in upholding the WBO’s discretion and the limited scope of judicial review in whistleblower cases.

  • Whistleblower 21276-13W v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 147 T.C. 121 (2016): Definition of ‘Collected Proceeds’ in Whistleblower Awards

    Whistleblower 21276-13W v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 147 T. C. 121 (2016)

    In a landmark decision, the U. S. Tax Court expanded the definition of ‘collected proceeds’ under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b) to include criminal fines and civil forfeitures, not just tax payments. This ruling significantly broadens the scope of whistleblower awards, potentially increasing the financial incentives for reporting tax evasion and fraud. It clarifies that whistleblowers can receive awards based on a percentage of all proceeds collected by the government, not limited to those collected under Title 26.

    Parties

    Whistleblower 21276-13W and Whistleblower 21277-13W, petitioners, v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent.

    Facts

    The petitioners, a husband and wife, sought whistleblower awards under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b) for information leading to the detection of tax underpayments and violations of internal revenue laws. The targeted taxpayer pleaded guilty to conspiring to defraud the IRS, file false Federal income tax returns, and evade Federal income tax, in violation of 18 U. S. C. sec. 371. The taxpayer paid $74,131,694 to the Government, consisting of tax restitution of $20,000,001, a criminal fine of $22,050,000, a civil forfeiture of $15,821,000 representing gross fees received from U. S. clients, and relinquishment of claims to $16,260,693 previously forfeited. The IRS Whistleblower Office initially rejected the petitioners’ claims as untimely, but the Tax Court held in a prior decision that the claims were timely and ordered the parties to resolve their differences. The parties agreed that the petitioners were eligible for an award of 24% of the collected proceeds, but disagreed on whether the criminal fine and civil forfeitures constituted ‘collected proceeds’ under sec. 7623(b).

    Procedural History

    The IRS Whistleblower Office initially denied the petitioners’ claims for awards, administratively closing their cases. The petitioners appealed to the U. S. Tax Court. In Whistleblower 21276-13W v. Commissioner, 144 T. C. 290 (2015), the court held that the claims were timely, ordered the parties to attempt resolution, and retained jurisdiction. The parties subsequently agreed that the petitioners were eligible for an award of 24% of the collected proceeds, but could not agree on the amount of collected proceeds. The court then issued a supplemental opinion to address the issue of what constitutes ‘collected proceeds’ under sec. 7623(b).

    Issue(s)

    Whether criminal fines and civil forfeitures paid by a taxpayer in connection with a violation of internal revenue laws constitute ‘collected proceeds’ for purposes of calculating a whistleblower award under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b)?

    Rule(s) of Law

    I. R. C. sec. 7623(b)(1) provides that if the Secretary proceeds with any administrative or judicial action based on information brought to the Secretary’s attention by an individual, the individual shall receive an award of at least 15% but not more than 30% of the collected proceeds (including penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts) resulting from the action. The term ‘collected proceeds’ is not statutorily defined.

    Holding

    The U. S. Tax Court held that criminal fines and civil forfeitures paid by the taxpayer in connection with violations of internal revenue laws constitute ‘collected proceeds’ for purposes of calculating a whistleblower award under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b).

    Reasoning

    The court’s reasoning focused on statutory interpretation and the plain meaning of the term ‘collected proceeds’. The court noted that the language of sec. 7623(b)(1) is plain and expansive, using terms such as ‘any administrative or judicial action’, ‘any related actions’, and ‘any settlement in response to such action’. The court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that ‘collected proceeds’ should be limited to amounts collected under Title 26, holding that internal revenue laws are not limited to those codified in Title 26. The court cited examples of internal revenue laws found outside Title 26 and noted that the term ‘proceeds’ is broad and general. The court also distinguished between the discretionary award program under sec. 7623(a), which requires awards to be paid from collected proceeds, and the mandatory award program under sec. 7623(b), which uses collected proceeds only for calculating the award amount. The court concluded that criminal fines and civil forfeitures, being part of the total amount brought in by the Government as a result of the whistleblower’s information, constitute ‘collected proceeds’ under sec. 7623(b).

    Disposition

    The court awarded the petitioners $17,791,607, representing 24% of the total $74,131,694 paid by the taxpayer, including the tax restitution, criminal fine, and civil forfeitures.

    Significance/Impact

    This decision significantly expands the scope of whistleblower awards under I. R. C. sec. 7623(b) by including criminal fines and civil forfeitures in the definition of ‘collected proceeds’. It provides a strong incentive for whistleblowers to come forward with information about tax evasion and fraud, as they may now receive awards based on a broader range of government collections. The decision clarifies the distinction between the discretionary and mandatory whistleblower award programs and reaffirms the court’s commitment to interpreting statutory language according to its plain meaning. The ruling may lead to increased whistleblower activity and more aggressive enforcement of tax laws by the IRS.