Tag: Abnormal Deductions

  • Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 1142 (1946): Abnormal Deduction Disallowance Under Excess Profits Tax

    7 T.C. 1142 (1946)

    An abnormal deduction is not disallowed for excess profits tax purposes if the abnormality was not a consequence of an increase in gross income or a change in the type, manner of operation, size, or condition of the business.

    Summary

    Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) sought to disallow certain abnormal deductions from 1939 to compute its excess profits tax credit for 1941 and 1942. These deductions included refunds of excessive gas rates, payments related to a former subsidiary, bad debt deductions from the subsidiary’s accounts, and losses from loans to the San Francisco Bay Exposition. The Tax Court addressed whether these deductions were properly disallowed under Section 711(b)(1)(K)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code, focusing on whether the abnormalities were a consequence of increased gross income or changes in business operations. The Court ruled in favor of PG&E on some issues, finding that certain deductions were not linked to increased income or operational changes, while siding with the Commissioner on others.

    Facts

    PG&E made several payments and incurred losses in 1939 that it later sought to treat as abnormal deductions for excess profits tax calculations: (1) Refunds of excessive gas rates collected in 1936. (2) Payment of an award against its former subsidiary, San Joaquin Light & Power. (3) Bad debt deductions from San Joaquin’s accounts receivable. (4) Losses from loans to the San Francisco Bay Exposition. PG&E dissolved San Joaquin at the end of 1938 and took over its assets and liabilities. PG&E argued these items should be excluded when calculating its excess profits tax credit.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in PG&E’s excess profits tax for 1941 and 1942, refusing to disallow certain deductions claimed by PG&E. PG&E appealed to the United States Tax Court, contesting the Commissioner’s decision. The Tax Court reviewed the facts and arguments, ultimately ruling in favor of PG&E on some issues and against it on others.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the refund of excessive gas rates collected in 1936 constitutes an abnormal deduction that should be disallowed under Section 711(b)(1)(K)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code?

    2. Whether the payment related to the former subsidiary, San Joaquin Light & Power Corporation, was a deductible expense or a capital expenditure?

    3. Whether the bad debt deductions from San Joaquin’s accounts receivable were a consequence of a change in the manner of operation of PG&E’s business?

    4. Whether the losses from loans to the San Francisco Bay Exposition were a consequence of an increase in PG&E’s gross income?

    Holding

    1. No, because the refund was not a consequence of an increase in gross income during the base period, as the gross income from gas sales actually decreased in 1936.

    2. The payment was a capital expenditure because it represented a liability of San Joaquin that PG&E had to discharge to protect its title to San Joaquin’s assets.

    3. Yes, because the bad debt deductions were a direct result of PG&E taking over San Joaquin’s business, representing a change in the manner of operation.

    4. No, because the losses were not a consequence of the increase in gross income. The loans and resulting bad debts were not caused by or a consequence of any increase in gross income.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Tax Court analyzed each deduction under Section 711(b)(1)(K)(ii), focusing on whether the abnormality stemmed from increased gross income or changes in business operations. Regarding the gas rate refunds, the court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the refund was a consequence of increased income, noting that gross income from gas sales had actually decreased. For the payment related to San Joaquin, the court determined it was a capital expenditure, not a deductible expense, as it was a liability PG&E assumed to acquire San Joaquin’s assets, citing Holdcroft Transportation Co. v. Commissioner, 153 Fed. (2d) 323. The court found the bad debt deductions from San Joaquin’s accounts were a consequence of PG&E’s change in business operations, as PG&E directly operated the business after dissolving San Joaquin. Finally, regarding the exposition loans, the court concluded the losses were not a consequence of increased gross income, stating, “The question is ‘the other way around’ — were the abnormal bad debt deductions a consequence of an increase in gross income in the base period or of a change in the type, manner of operation, size, or condition of the business?”

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the application of Section 711(b)(1)(K)(ii) in determining abnormal deductions for excess profits tax purposes. It emphasizes the importance of establishing a direct causal link between the abnormality and either an increase in gross income or a change in business operations. The decision highlights that merely experiencing increased income or business changes is insufficient; the abnormality must be a direct consequence of these factors. This ruling provides guidance for analyzing similar cases involving abnormal deductions, especially in scenarios involving corporate mergers, acquisitions, and dissolutions, influencing how tax professionals advise clients on structuring transactions and calculating tax liabilities.

  • Laredo Bridge Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 17 (1946): Abnormal Deduction Exclusion for Excess Profits Tax

    7 T.C. 17 (1946)

    A loss resulting from the condemnation of a business asset is an abnormal deduction that can be disregarded when calculating excess profits net income, provided the loss isn’t a consequence of changes in the business’s operation, size, or condition, but is instead the cause of such changes.

    Summary

    Laredo Bridge Co. sustained a capital loss in 1937 due to the Mexican government’s condemnation of the Mexican end of its international bridge. In computing its 1941 excess profits tax liability, the company sought to disregard this loss, arguing it was abnormal. The Tax Court agreed, holding that the condemnation loss was an abnormal deduction under Section 711(b)(1)(J) of the Internal Revenue Code and that the loss was the cause, not the consequence, of a change in the size of its business. This allowed the company to reduce its excess profits tax liability.

    Facts

    Laredo Bridge Co. owned and operated an international toll bridge connecting Laredo, Texas, and Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. A concession from the Mexican government granted in 1887 stipulated that after 50 years, the Mexican government could take over the Mexican end of the bridge, paying two-thirds of its appraised value. On June 6, 1937, the Mexican government exercised this right and paid the company $75,877.48. This resulted in a loss of $68,575.53 for Laredo Bridge Co. Subsequently, the company reduced its capital stock and distributed cash to stockholders. The company collected tolls on traffic leaving the United States. The Mexican government collected tolls on traffic entering the United States.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in Laredo Bridge Co.’s excess profits tax for 1941. Laredo Bridge Co. petitioned the Tax Court, arguing that the 1937 loss should be disregarded when computing its excess profits net income for that year. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the petitioner, Laredo Bridge Co.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the loss sustained by Laredo Bridge Co. due to the condemnation of the Mexican end of its bridge by the Mexican government constitutes an abnormal deduction that should be disregarded when calculating excess profits net income for 1937 under Section 711(b)(1)(J) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the loss was an abnormal deduction and was the cause, not the consequence, of a change in the size of the company’s business, as required by Section 711(b)(1)(K)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Tax Court analyzed Section 711(b)(1)(J) and (K)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code, which addresses abnormal deductions in calculating excess profits net income. The court determined that the loss was indeed an abnormal deduction for Laredo Bridge Co. The crucial question was whether the loss was a consequence of a change in the size of the business. The court examined the meaning of “consequence,” defining it as “that which follows something on which it depends; that which is produced by a cause.” The court found that the condemnation was the cause, leading to both the loss and the change in the size of the business. The court stated, “The loss has no relation to and is in no way measured by the size of the business, or the amount of business done.” The court distinguished between the loss from the asset’s disposition and the potential loss of future earnings due to the business size change. Because the loss resulted directly from the condemnation and not from a prior change in business size, the court held that the deduction should be disregarded, benefiting the company’s excess profits tax calculation.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies how to treat losses resulting from condemnations or similar involuntary conversions when calculating excess profits tax. It emphasizes that the abnormality of a deduction is a key factor, but also that the *cause* of the loss must be distinguished from its *consequences*. If a loss directly leads to a change in business size, it can be considered abnormal and disregarded for excess profits tax purposes. This decision impacts how businesses can structure their arguments when seeking to reduce excess profits tax by excluding abnormal deductions. Later cases must carefully examine the chain of events to determine whether a loss was truly the *cause* of business changes or merely a *consequence* of other factors.

  • Frank Ix & Sons Virginia Corp. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 529 (1946): Abnormal Deduction Disallowance under Excess Profits Tax Act

    Frank Ix & Sons Virginia Corp. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 529 (1946)

    An abnormal deduction will be disallowed for purposes of calculating excess profits tax if the abnormality is a consequence of a change in the type, manner of operation, size, or condition of the business engaged in by the taxpayer.

    Summary

    Frank Ix & Sons Virginia Corp. sought relief under Section 711(b)(1)(J) of the Internal Revenue Code, claiming abnormal deductions during its base period years to reduce its excess profits tax. The Tax Court addressed whether certain deductions were genuinely abnormal and, if so, whether they resulted from changes in the company’s operations. The court held that most of the claimed abnormalities should be allowed, except for the wages of inspectors and measurers, as those were a direct consequence of a change in the manner of the business’s operation. The court also held the IRS waived certain affirmative defenses by failing to plead them.

    Facts

    Frank Ix & Sons Virginia Corp. filed a claim asserting 21 abnormalities across 13 different classes of deductions in its base period years. These claimed abnormalities aimed to increase the company’s net income for those base periods, thereby reducing its excess profits tax liability. One significant change was the employment of inspectors and measurers starting in 1939 to improve quality control and reduce customer dissatisfaction with improperly sized garments.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner denied the corporation’s claim, arguing the abnormalities resulted from increased gross income, decreased deductions, or changes in the business. The Tax Court reviewed the Commissioner’s determination, focusing on whether the claimed deductions met the statutory requirements for disallowance under Section 711(b)(1)(J).

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the claimed deductions were “abnormal deductions” within the meaning of Section 711(b)(1)(J) of the Internal Revenue Code.
    2. Whether the abnormalities were a consequence of an increase in gross income, a decrease in some other deduction, or a change in the type, manner of operation, size, or condition of the business.
    3. Whether the Commissioner could raise new affirmative defenses not initially cited in the rejection of the claim.

    Holding

    1. Yes, for most deductions. The court found that the petitioner presented a prima facie case for most items.
    2. No, except for wages of inspectors and measurers. The court found wages for inspectors and measurers were a direct result of a change in the business’s operations because they were hired to fix a specific operational problem.
    3. No, because the Commissioner failed to plead those defenses and the petitioner was not given fair notice or an opportunity to respond.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that the taxpayer had presented sufficient evidence to show that most of the claimed abnormalities were not a consequence of increased gross income, decreased deductions, or changes in the business, thus satisfying the requirements of Section 711(b)(1)(K). However, the wages paid to inspectors and measurers were directly linked to a change in the company’s operational methods. The court distinguished this from employing efficiency experts, whose studies lead to changes, but their mere employment doesn’t constitute a change in operations itself. Regarding the Commissioner’s unpleaded defenses, the court emphasized fairness and procedural rules, stating that the petitioner “can not fairly be required to anticipate these other defenses or to introduce evidence to negative unfavorable possibilities upon which they are conjectured.” The court relied on precedent from Maltine Co., 5 T. C. 1265; Warner G. Baird, 42 B. T. A. 970; Robert G. Coffey, 21 B. T. A. 1242 in support of this holding.

    Practical Implications

    This case highlights the importance of establishing clear causation when claiming abnormal deductions for excess profits tax purposes. Taxpayers must demonstrate that the abnormality was not a consequence of changes in their business operations. It also illustrates the necessity for the IRS to raise all relevant defenses in its initial rejection of a claim or through proper pleadings, preventing the surprise introduction of new arguments during litigation. This case has implications for tax planning and litigation strategy, requiring detailed documentation of business changes and their impact on specific deductions. Later cases would likely cite this case to interpret the causation requirements under similar tax provisions.

  • Wentworth Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1201 (1946): Abnormal Deduction and Changes in Business Operations

    6 T.C. 1201 (1946)

    For excess profits tax purposes, an abnormal deduction is not disallowed if it results from a change in the manner of operating the business.

    Summary

    Wentworth Manufacturing Co. sought relief under Section 711(b)(1)(J) of the Internal Revenue Code, claiming certain deductions during the base period (1937-1940) were abnormal and should be eliminated to increase its excess profits tax credit. The Tax Court addressed whether these deductions were indeed abnormal and, if so, whether they resulted from changes in the company’s business operations, specifically the introduction of inspectors and measurers to improve quality control. The court disallowed the exclusion of wage expenses related to the inspectors and measurers, as those expenses were a direct consequence of a change in the business’s manner of operation.

    Facts

    Wentworth Manufacturing Co. manufactured cotton house dresses. In 1938, the company moved its plant from Chicago to Fall River, Massachusetts. Starting in 1939, the company hired inspectors and measurers due to customer complaints about sizing inaccuracies. The company sought to eliminate certain deductions from its base period income to increase its excess profits tax credit, arguing they were abnormal under Section 711(b)(1)(J) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Procedural History

    Wentworth Manufacturing Co. filed an excess profits tax return for the fiscal year ending October 31, 1941, and subsequently filed a claim for refund under Section 711(b)(1)(J) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied the claim. Wentworth then petitioned the Tax Court for review of the Commissioner’s determination.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether certain deductions (advertising, telephone & telegraph, moving, transfer & registrar fees, unemployment insurance tax, bad debts, lease cancellation, amortization of leasehold improvements, and damage claims) were abnormal within the meaning of Section 711(b)(1)(J) of the Internal Revenue Code.
    2. Whether the wages paid to inspectors and measurers were abnormal and, if so, whether the abnormality was a consequence of a change in the manner of operation of the business under Section 711(b)(1)(K)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Holding

    1. Yes, certain deductions were abnormal under Section 711(b)(1)(J) as limited by (K)(iii) because the taxpayer demonstrated these expenses were unusual and not related to increased income or decreased deductions.
    2. No, the abnormality in wages paid to inspectors and measurers was a consequence of a change in the manner of operation of the business because the company hired these employees to address quality control issues, thereby changing its operational methods.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Tax Court found that Wentworth had demonstrated that several deductions were abnormal and not a consequence of increased gross income or decreased deductions. However, the court focused on the wages paid to inspectors and measurers. The court reasoned that the employment of these individuals directly altered the company’s operational methods to address customer complaints and improve quality. The court distinguished this from employing efficiency engineers, whose recommendations might lead to changes, but their mere employment did not constitute a change in operations. The court emphasized that Section 711(b)(1)(K)(ii) disallows the deduction only if the abnormality is a consequence of the change in operations. Since the employment of inspectors and measurers directly impacted how the business was run, the associated wage expenses were a consequence of that change, and therefore, the deduction could not be disallowed. The court stated, “The important point is that the abnormalities in the wages of these employees was a consequence of a change in the manner of operation of the business. If there had been no change in the manner of operation of the business, the inspectors and measurers would never have been employed and no abnormality would have resulted…”

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies how changes in business operations affect the determination of abnormal deductions for excess profits tax purposes. It illustrates that simply incurring unusual expenses is not enough to justify excluding them from base period income. The abnormality must not result from an intentional change in how the business is conducted. This case provides a framework for analyzing whether specific expenses are tied to changes in business operations, emphasizing a direct causal link. It highlights the importance of distinguishing between changes resulting from implementing new strategies versus merely studying potential improvements. Later cases would likely cite this for the principle that deductions cannot be disallowed if they stem from intentional and material changes to business operations. It also serves as a reminder to properly plead affirmative defenses.

  • Consolidated Motor Lines v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1066 (1946): Defining ‘Losses’ for Excess Profits Tax Adjustments

    6 T.C. 1066 (1946)

    Increased operating expenses, even if unusual in amount due to extraordinary circumstances, do not automatically qualify as “losses” under Section 711(b)(1)(E) of the Internal Revenue Code for the purpose of adjusting base period net income for excess profits tax calculations.

    Summary

    Consolidated Motor Lines, a freight carrier, contested the Commissioner’s adjustments to its 1940 income and excess profits taxes. The dispute centered on whether certain expenses and deductions from the base period years (1936-1939) were properly treated. Key issues included the abnormality of interest expenses in 1938, the treatment of expenses related to a 1938 hurricane, and the deductibility of uncompensated losses from cargo damage and accidents. The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner’s determination regarding interest expenses and hurricane-related costs, but sided with the taxpayer on the insurance credit issue. The court ultimately determined that the expenses related to cargo damage and accidents were ordinary business expenses, not losses, and therefore did not warrant adjustment under the relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.

    Facts

    Consolidated Motor Lines was a common carrier operating in several northeastern states. In computing its excess profits tax for 1940, the company sought adjustments to its base period income, claiming that certain deductions were abnormal. Specifically, it argued that interest expenses in 1938 were abnormally high, that expenses related to a hurricane in September 1938 constituted deductible losses, and that uncompensated expenses for cargo damage and accidents should be treated as losses. The company accrued insurance premiums to a broker on its books; however, the broker account reflected a $6,651.05 excess credit at the close of 1939 and 1940, due to inaccurate accounting. In 1938, Consolidated accrued $928.38 in excess insurance premiums for worker’s compensation insurance.

    Procedural History

    Consolidated Motor Lines filed its federal income and excess profits tax returns. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in both income and excess profits taxes. Consolidated petitioned the Tax Court, contesting several of the Commissioner’s adjustments. The Tax Court addressed multiple issues, including the treatment of interest expenses, hurricane-related expenses, insurance credits, and losses from cargo damage and accidents.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Commissioner erred in including in petitioner’s income $7,579.43 charged to expense in previous years in excess of the proper amount.

    2. Whether petitioner’s income for the base period year 1938 should be increased by disallowance of deduction of $10,959.85 interest, which petitioner contends was abnormal.

    3. Whether excess profits net income for the base period year 1938 should be increased by disallowance of expenses claimed as abnormal as caused by a hurricane.

    4. Whether excess profits net income for the base period years 1936-1939 should be increased by disallowing uncompensated expenses claimed as losses from fire, rain, collision, accident, and theft.

    Holding

    1. No, the Commissioner erred, because the amounts were improperly added to income in 1940, mirroring the court’s prior ruling in Greene Motor Co.

    2. No, because the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the abnormality in interest expense was not a consequence of changes in the size or condition of its business.

    3. No, because the increased operating costs due to the hurricane did not constitute “losses” within the meaning of Section 711(b)(1)(E) of the Internal Revenue Code.

    4. No, because the payments for damages and injuries were ordinary business expenses, not losses, and were properly deducted as such, without warranting adjustment under Section 711(b)(1)(E).

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the interest expense, the court found that Consolidated had not proven that the increased interest deduction in 1938 was not a consequence of an increase in the size or condition of its business, as required by Section 711(b)(1)(K)(ii). The court emphasized that Consolidated needed to show that the increased borrowing was not related to any increase in business activity at any time. Regarding the hurricane expenses, the court reasoned that an increase in expenses, even if unusual, does not constitute a “loss” under the relevant tax code provisions. It cited Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, stating that a mere increase in expenses of the nature ordinarily incurred was caused by an unusual situation. The court stated, “The payment was certainly not a loss within § 23 (f). The court emphasized that such expenses were ordinary, even if infrequent. As to the insurance credits, the court followed Greene Motor Co. in holding that the Commissioner had improperly added the credits to income in 1940. On the final issue, the court determined that payments for cargo damage and accidents were ordinary and necessary business expenses, not losses from casualty or theft. The court highlighted that the company had treated these payments as expenses, not losses, in its original returns. The court stated that a common carrier constantly shipping freight over the public highways may not reasonably be said to suffer unusual casualty or abnormal ‘loss’ as a result of the matters here being considered.

    Practical Implications

    This case clarifies the distinction between ordinary business expenses and deductible “losses” for the purpose of calculating excess profits tax credits. It establishes that increased operating costs, even those resulting from extraordinary events like natural disasters, are not automatically classified as losses. Taxpayers seeking to adjust base period income based on abnormalities must demonstrate that those abnormalities are not simply the result of business growth or other ordinary business activities. Moreover, the case highlights the importance of consistent accounting treatment; items treated as expenses in original filings are unlikely to be reclassified as losses for tax benefit purposes later on. Subsequent cases involving similar issues must carefully analyze the specific facts to determine whether the expenditures are truly abnormal losses or merely elevated ordinary business expenses, focusing on whether they are recurring or unusual events.

  • R. C. Harvey Company v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 431 (1945): Defining ‘Abnormal Deductions’ for Excess Profits Tax

    5 T.C. 431 (1945)

    For excess profits tax calculations, a one-time payment to settle a contract dispute constitutes an ‘abnormal deduction’ if it deviates from the company’s typical expenses and isn’t simply a substitute for other, regular costs.

    Summary

    R.C. Harvey Co. sought to adjust its excess profits net income for the 1939 base period, claiming a $15,000 payment to a former employee, Gordon, for breach of contract was an ‘abnormal deduction.’ The Tax Court held that the payment, stemming from a contract dispute and threatened litigation, qualified as an abnormal deduction. This was because it was a one-time settlement, not a recurring business expense. Further, the court found that this abnormality wasn’t just a disguised substitute for other regular expenses, like commissions, despite a subsequent decrease in commission expenses after Gordon’s departure. The court sided with the company, allowing the adjustment for excess profits tax purposes.

    Facts

    R.C. Harvey Co. hired Jacob Gordon as a purchasing agent under a contract entitling him to commissions and a percentage of net earnings. After the death of a key executive, disputes arose between Harvey and Gordon regarding inventory and purchasing practices. Consequently, R.C. Harvey Co. terminated Gordon’s contract, leading to threats of litigation by Gordon. To avoid a lawsuit, the company paid Gordon $15,000 as a settlement for breach of contract, in addition to $2,500 for earned commissions.

    Procedural History

    The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the $15,000 payment as an adjustment to the company’s excess profits net income for the base period year 1939, arguing it wasn’t a qualifying ‘claim’ under Section 711(b)(1)(H) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Tax Court reversed the Commissioner’s determination, finding the payment was indeed an abnormal deduction properly attributable to a claim.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a payment made to a former employee in settlement of a threatened breach of contract lawsuit constitutes an ‘abnormal deduction’ under Section 711(b)(1)(H) of the Internal Revenue Code for the purpose of calculating excess profits tax.

    Holding

    Yes, because the payment arose from a specific contract dispute, resulting in a one-time settlement to avoid litigation, and because the abnormality was not a consequence of factors enumerated in Section 711 (b)(1)(K)(ii).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Tax Court reasoned that the $15,000 payment was directly attributable to Gordon’s claim for damages resulting from the breach of contract. The court emphasized that the payment was a settlement to avoid litigation and secure a release from all claims. The court stated that the definition of ‘abnormal’ is that it deviates from the normal condition; not corresponding to the type; markedly or strangely irregular. The court dismissed the Commissioner’s argument that the payment was merely anticipated commissions or a substitute for future compensation. The court also emphasized that it was up to the taxpayer to prove that abnormality was not a consequence of an increase in the gross income of the taxpayer in its base period or a decrease in the amount of some other deduction in its base period. Despite a subsequent decrease in commission expenses after Gordon’s departure, the court found that the settlement payment was not a direct consequence of this decrease. The court also clarified that, in determining whether a deduction attributable to a claim against the taxpayer is ‘abnormal for the taxpayer’ they do not regard as material the factor as to whether the taxpayer was or was not benefited by the payment of the claim.

    Practical Implications

    The R. C. Harvey Co. case provides guidance on how to classify deductions as ‘abnormal’ for excess profits tax purposes. It clarifies that settlement payments arising from contract disputes can qualify as abnormal deductions if they represent a deviation from the company’s regular business expenses. It also warns against attempts to recharacterize such payments as disguised forms of regular compensation or substitutes for other deductions. This case highlights the importance of documenting the specific circumstances surrounding a payment to demonstrate its unusual and non-recurring nature. It establishes that a deduction cannot be disallowed unless the taxpayer establishes that the abnormality or excess is not a consequence of an increase in the gross income of the taxpayer in its base period or a decrease in the amount of some other deduction in its base period, and is not a consequence of a change at any time in the type, manner of operation, size, or condition of the business engaged in by the taxpayer.