

115 T.C. 605 (2000)

For federal income tax purposes, a sale of real property is considered complete upon the earlier of the transfer of legal title or when the benefits and burdens of ownership are practically transferred to the buyer, particularly under contracts for deed.

Summary

The Tax Court held that sales of residential real property via contracts for deed by Greenville Insurance Agency (GIA) were completed sales in the year the contracts were executed, not when final payment was received and title transferred. GIA, owned by Mrs. Keith, sold properties using contracts for deed where buyers took possession, paid taxes, insurance, and maintenance, and made monthly payments. GIA deferred recognizing gain until full payment, treating earlier payments as deposits and depreciating the properties. The court determined that under Georgia law, these contracts transferred equitable ownership to the buyers, thus constituting completed sales for tax purposes in the year of execution, requiring immediate income recognition.

Facts

Greenville Insurance Agency (GIA), a proprietorship of Mrs. Keith, engaged in selling residential real property using contracts for deed.

Under these contracts, buyers obtained immediate possession of the properties.

Buyers were responsible for paying property taxes, insurance, and maintenance from the contract's execution date.

Buyers made monthly payments towards the purchase price, including interest.

GIA retained legal title and agreed to deliver a warranty deed only upon full payment of the contract price.

Default by the buyer would render the contract null and void, with GIA retaining all prior payments as liquidated damages.

GIA accounted for these transactions by deferring gain recognition until full payment and title transfer, reporting only interest income and depreciating the properties in the interim.

Procedural History

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in petitioners' federal income taxes for 1993, 1994, and 1995, challenging the method of accounting for gains from contracts for deed.

The case was submitted to the United States Tax Court fully stipulated.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the contracts for deed executed by GIA constituted completed sales of real property for federal income tax purposes in the year of execution.
2. Whether the petitioners' method of accounting for gains from these contracts for deed clearly reflected income.
3. Whether net operating loss carryovers claimed by petitioners should be adjusted to reflect income from contracts for deed executed in prior years.

Holding

1. Yes, the contracts for deed constituted completed sales for federal income tax purposes in the year of execution because they transferred the benefits and burdens of ownership to the buyers.
2. No, the petitioners' method of deferring gain recognition did not clearly reflect income because as an accrual method taxpayer, income must be recognized when the right to receive it is fixed and determinable, which occurred at contract execution.
3. Yes, the net operating loss carryovers must be adjusted to account for income that should have been recognized in prior years from contracts for deed executed in those years.

Court's Reasoning

The court reasoned that under federal tax law, a sale is complete when either legal title passes or the benefits and burdens of ownership transfer. Citing precedent like *Major Realty Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner*, the court emphasized that the practical assumption of ownership rights is key.

Applying Georgia state law, the court analyzed the contracts for deed and found they were analogous to bonds for title, as interpreted by the Georgia Supreme Court in *Chilivis v. Tumlin Woods Realty Associates, Inc.* Georgia law treats such contracts as creating equitable ownership in the buyer and a security interest for the seller.

The court noted that the contracts in question gave buyers possession, required them to pay taxes, insurance, and maintenance, and assume liabilities, all indicative of the burdens and benefits of ownership. The ability of buyers to accelerate payments to obtain a warranty deed further supported this conclusion.

The court explicitly overruled its prior decision in *Baertschi v. Commissioner*, aligning with the Sixth Circuit's reversal, and held that a non-recourse clause (or

similar voidability upon default) does not prevent a sale from being complete when the benefits and burdens of ownership are transferred.

As accrual method taxpayers, GIA was required to recognize income when ‘all events have occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy.’ The court determined that the execution of the contracts fixed GIA’s right to receive income, with buyer default being a condition subsequent that did not prevent income accrual at the time of sale.

Practical Implications

This case clarifies the application of the completed sale doctrine in the context of contracts for deed, particularly for accrual method taxpayers in jurisdictions like Georgia where such contracts are interpreted to transfer equitable ownership.

Legal practitioners should advise clients selling property via contracts for deed that, for federal income tax purposes, the sale is likely considered completed upon contract execution, not upon final payment and title transfer, especially if the buyer assumes typical ownership responsibilities.

Taxpayers using accrual accounting who engage in similar transactions must recognize gains in the year of contract execution to accurately reflect income and avoid potential deficiencies and penalties.

This decision reinforces the IRS’s authority to determine whether a taxpayer’s accounting method clearly reflects income and to mandate changes if it does not, especially concerning the timing of income recognition in real estate transactions.

Later cases will likely cite *Keith v. Commissioner* to support the immediate recognition of income for accrual method taxpayers in real estate sales where equitable ownership transfers before legal title, emphasizing the ‘benefits and burdens’ test and the irrelevance of non-recourse default provisions in determining sale completion.