***107 T.C. 35 (1996)***

A cash basis taxpayer cannot deduct interest expenses when the purported interest payment is made with funds borrowed from the same lender; such a transaction is considered a postponement of interest payment, not actual payment.

**Summary**

The petitioners, partners in White Tail partnership, sought to deduct interest expenses on their 1980 tax return. White Tail, a cash basis partnership, had borrowed funds from John Hancock and subsequently 'paid' interest using additional funds borrowed from the same lender. The Tax Court disallowed the interest deductions. The court reasoned that for a cash basis taxpayer, interest must be paid in cash or its equivalent. When a borrower uses funds borrowed from the same lender to pay interest, it is not considered a true payment but merely an increase in debt. The court rejected the partnership's argument that they had 'unrestricted control' over the borrowed funds, emphasizing the substance of the transaction over its form. This case reinforces the principle that interest must be genuinely paid, not merely deferred through further borrowing from the original creditor.

**Facts**

White Tail, a cash basis partnership, obtained a loan commitment from John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. in 1980 for up to $29 million.

On May 7, 1980, John Hancock disbursed $19,645,000, of which $227,647.22 was credited to White Tail's prior loan account to cover accrued interest on the previous loan.

In December 1980, facing a significant interest payment due on January 1, 1981, White Tail requested a modification to the loan agreement to prevent default.

John Hancock agreed to modify the loan, allowing White Tail to borrow up to 50% of the interest due. Later, John Hancock agreed to lend the entire interest amount.

On December 30, 1980, John Hancock wired $1,587,310.46 to White Tail's bank account, specifically for the purpose of covering the interest due.

On December 31, 1980, White Tail wired $1,595,017.96 back to John Hancock, representing the interest and a small principal payment.

White Tail claimed interest deductions for both the $227,647.22 and $1,587,310.46 amounts on its 1980 partnership return.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed these interest deductions.

**Procedural History**

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The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency to Charles and Lessie Davison, partners in White Tail, disallowing their distributive share of ordinary loss due to the disallowed interest deductions.

The Davisons petitioned the United States Tax Court to contest the deficiency.

The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's disallowance of the interest deductions.

**Issue(s)**

1. Whether White Tail, a cash basis partnership, 'paid' interest within the meaning of Section 163(a) of the Internal Revenue Code when it used funds borrowed from John Hancock to satisfy its interest obligations to the same lender on December 31, 1980?

2. Whether White Tail 'paid' interest when John Hancock credited $227,647.22 from the loan disbursement on May 7, 1980, to satisfy interest owed on a prior loan, while simultaneously increasing the principal on the new loan?

**Holding**

1. No. The Tax Court held that White Tail did not 'pay' interest on December 31, 1980, because the funds used were borrowed from the same lender for the express purpose of paying interest. This transaction merely postponed the interest payment.

2. No. The Tax Court held that White Tail did not 'pay' interest on May 7, 1980, because crediting interest due and simultaneously increasing the loan principal does not constitute a cash payment of interest. It is merely a bookkeeping entry that defers the payment.

**Court's Reasoning**

The court emphasized that for cash basis taxpayers, a deduction for interest requires actual payment in cash or its equivalent. A promissory note or a promise to pay is not sufficient for a cash basis deduction. Referencing *Don E. Williams Co. v. Commissioner*, the court reiterated that payment must be made in cash or its equivalent.

The court distinguished between paying interest with funds from a different lender (deductible) and using funds borrowed from the same lender (not deductible). Citing *Menz v. Commissioner*, the court noted that when funds are borrowed from a different lender to pay interest to the first, a deduction is allowed.

The court addressed the 'unrestricted control' doctrine, originating from *Burgess v. Commissioner*, where deductions were sometimes allowed if the borrower had unrestricted control over borrowed funds, even if subsequently used to pay interest to the same lender. However, the court acknowledged that this doctrine had been

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criticized and narrowed by appellate courts, particularly in *Battelstein v. IRS* and *Wilkerson v. Commissioner* (9th Cir. reversal of Tax Court).

The Tax Court in *Davison* explicitly moved away from a strict 'unrestricted control' test, focusing instead on the substance of the transaction. The court stated, "In light of our expanded view of the considerations that must be taken into account in determining whether a borrower has unrestricted control over borrowed funds, our earlier opinions in *Burgess, Burck*, and *Wilkerson*, have been sapped of much of their vitality."

The court adopted a substance-over-form approach, holding that "a cash basis borrower is not entitled to an interest deduction where the funds used to satisfy the interest obligation were borrowed for that purpose from the same lender to whom the interest was owed." The court found that in both the May and December transactions, the funds were specifically advanced by John Hancock to cover interest, and the net effect was merely an increase in the loan principal, not a genuine payment of interest.

The court quoted *Battelstein v. IRS*: "If the second loan was for the purpose of financing the interest due on the first loan, then the taxpayer's interest obligation on the first loan has not been paid as Section 163(a) requires; it has merely been postponed."

Regarding the May transaction, the court cited *Cleaver v. Commissioner*, stating that withholding interest from loan proceeds and marking it 'paid' does not constitute actual payment for deduction purposes.

**Practical Implications**

*Davison v. Commissioner* provides a clear and practical application of the 'same lender rule' for cash basis taxpayers seeking interest deductions. It clarifies that merely routing funds through a borrower's account when the source and destination of funds for interest payment is the same lender will not create a deductible interest payment.

Legal practitioners should advise cash basis clients that to secure an interest deduction, payments must be made from funds not borrowed from the same creditor to whom the interest is owed. Structuring transactions to create the appearance of payment without a genuine change in economic position will likely be scrutinized under the substance-over-form doctrine.

This case emphasizes the importance of analyzing the economic substance of transactions, particularly in tax law, over their formalistic steps. It signals a shift away from a potentially manipulable 'unrestricted control' test towards a more pragmatic assessment of whether a true payment of interest has occurred.

Subsequent cases and IRS guidance have consistently followed the principle

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established in *Davison*, reinforcing the ‘same lender rule’ as a cornerstone of cash basis interest deduction analysis.

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