

90 T.C. 1256 (1988)

A taxpayer who unreasonably protracts tax litigation proceedings after the IRS offers full concession is not entitled to litigation costs for the period of unreasonable delay, and attorney's fees must be reasonable and directly related to the case at hand.

Summary

In this Tax Court case, the court determined the amount of reasonable litigation costs to be awarded to the Mearkles, who had previously won their case and were deemed prevailing parties. The court found that while the IRS's initial position was unreasonable (as determined by the Sixth Circuit on appeal), the Mearkles had unreasonably protracted the proceedings by refusing to accept a full concession from the IRS months before trial. Additionally, the court scrutinized the claimed attorney's fees, finding them excessive and partly attributable to representing other taxpayers. Ultimately, the court significantly reduced the litigation costs awarded, emphasizing the principles of reasonableness, proportionality, and the impermissibility of claiming costs for delays caused by the prevailing party and for services not solely for the case at hand.

Facts

The IRS determined a \$149 deficiency in the Mearkles' 1981 federal income tax due to a disallowed home office deduction related to their Amway business. This determination was based on a proposed regulation later deemed inconsistent with the statute by the Tax Court in **Scott v. Commissioner**. After the appeal period in **Scott** expired, the IRS offered to fully concede the Mearkles' case. The Mearkles refused to accept the concession, seeking a decision document that acknowledged the IRS's concession was due to the **Scott** decision, intending to benefit other Amway distributors facing similar issues. The case proceeded, and the Mearkles ultimately prevailed and sought litigation costs.

Procedural History

1. ****Tax Court Initial Decision:**** The Tax Court initially denied litigation costs, finding the IRS's position reasonable based on the proposed regulation.
2. ****Sixth Circuit Appeal:**** The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding the IRS's position unreasonable and remanded the case to the Tax Court to determine reasonable litigation costs.
3. ****Tax Court Supplemental Opinion (Remand):**** On remand, the Tax Court issued this supplemental opinion, determining the amount of reasonable litigation costs, considering the Mearkles' protraction of proceedings and the reasonableness of claimed fees.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the Mearkles unreasonably protracted the litigation proceedings by refusing to accept the IRS's full concession, thus precluding an award of litigation costs for the period of protraction?
2. Whether the claimed attorney's fees, particularly for petition preparation and legal memoranda, were reasonable in amount and scope, considering they might have benefited other taxpayers beyond the Mearkles?
3. What is the reasonable amount of litigation costs to be awarded to the Mearkles, considering the limitations imposed by section 7430 of the Internal Revenue Code and the court's findings on protraction and fee reasonableness?

Holding

1. ****Yes.**** The Mearkles unreasonably protracted the proceedings by refusing to accept the IRS's full concession in October 1985, and therefore are not entitled to litigation costs incurred after that offer.
2. ****No.**** The claimed attorney's fees, particularly the amounts claimed for petition preparation and legal memoranda, were not entirely reasonable as they were deemed excessive, disproportionate to the deficiency, and potentially intended to benefit other taxpayers.
3. The reasonable amount of litigation costs to be awarded is significantly reduced to \$2,860, encompassing specific allowances for petition preparation, legal memorandum, trial preparation, motion for litigation costs, and court filing fees, based on hourly rates deemed reasonable by the court and excluding costs incurred due to unreasonable protraction and fees not solely for the Mearkles' case.

Court's Reasoning

The court reasoned that while the Sixth Circuit determined the IRS's initial position unreasonable, the Mearkles' conduct after the IRS offered full concession became a critical factor in determining reasonable litigation costs. The court emphasized that section 7430, as amended, disallows costs for any period where the prevailing party unreasonably protracts proceedings. The court found the Mearkles' refusal to settle, aimed at securing a concession beneficial to other taxpayers, constituted unreasonable protraction.

Regarding attorney's fees, the court found the claimed amounts, particularly \$11,314.50 for petition preparation and \$15,267.50 for a legal memorandum, to be "grossly inflated" and "excessive and unreasonable," especially considering the \$149 deficiency. The court noted the attorneys' services appeared to benefit Amway distributors generally, not solely the Mearkles. Referencing amended section 7430 guidelines, the court applied an hourly rate of \$75 (lower than the claimed rates of \$85-\$185) and significantly reduced the hours allowed for each task, estimating 3 hours for petition preparation, 10 hours for the legal memorandum, 10 hours for trial preparation, and 5 hours for the motion for litigation costs. The court quoted the Sixth Circuit's concern about the disproportionate fees relative to the small deficiency and the potential ethical implications of fees not solely for the Mearkles.

The court concluded that litigation costs should be reasonable and directly related to the petitioners' case, not inflated by broader agendas or unreasonable delays.

Practical Implications

Mearkle v. Commissioner sets important precedents regarding the recovery of litigation costs in tax cases. It clarifies that even when the IRS's initial position is unreasonable, a prevailing taxpayer's entitlement to litigation costs is not absolute. Taxpayers must act reasonably throughout the litigation, including accepting appropriate settlement offers. Refusing reasonable concessions to pursue broader objectives can result in reduced or denied litigation cost awards for the period of unreasonable protraction. The case also underscores the necessity for attorney's fees to be reasonable and directly attributable to the specific taxpayer's case. Courts will scrutinize fee claims, especially when they appear disproportionate to the amount in controversy or suggest services benefiting a wider group. This case serves as a cautionary tale for taxpayers and attorneys to ensure litigation conduct remains reasonable and fee claims are well-justified and proportionate to the case at hand, particularly in tax litigation where cost recovery is governed by statute and principles of reasonableness.