

## ***Porter v. Commissioner, 88 T. C. 548 (1987)***

Federal judges are not considered employees under the tax code and thus are eligible to deduct contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts.

### **Summary**

The U. S. Tax Court in *Porter v. Commissioner* held that federal judges, due to their unique status as officers of the United States and not common law employees, were not barred from deducting contributions to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) under IRC sections 219 and 220. The case centered on whether federal judges, who have life tenure and receive a salary that cannot be diminished, were considered active participants in a retirement plan established for employees of the United States. The court found that judges were not employees, thus not subject to the disallowance of IRA deductions, and allowed the deductions for the petitioners.

### **Facts**

Several federal judges established IRAs and made contributions during 1980 and 1981. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed their deductions, asserting that the judges were active participants in a plan established for employees by the United States, under IRC section 219(b)(2)(A)(iv). The judges, entitled to hold office for life during good behavior, were subject to various mechanisms under the Judicial Code for separation from active service while continuing to receive payments.

### **Procedural History**

The judges petitioned the U. S. Tax Court after the Commissioner determined deficiencies in their federal income and excise taxes due to disallowed IRA deductions. The court consolidated the cases and heard arguments on whether federal judges were considered employees under the tax code and thus subject to the disallowance of IRA deductions.

### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether federal judges are considered employees within the meaning of IRC section 219(b)(2)(A)(iv).
2. Whether federal judges are active participants in a plan established by the United States for its employees.
3. Whether federal judges are entitled to deduct contributions made to their IRAs under IRC sections 219 and 220.

### **Holding**

1. No, because federal judges are not common law employees and thus not covered by the plan established for employees by the United States.
2. No, because federal judges are not considered employees, they cannot be active

participants in a plan established for employees by the United States.

3. Yes, because federal judges are not barred by IRC section 219(b)(2)(A)(iv) from deducting contributions to their IRAs.

### **Court's Reasoning**

The court applied the common law definition of an employee, focusing on the right of control, and concluded that federal judges, as officers of the United States, were not employees. The judges' duties and powers are defined by the Constitution and statutes, and they are not subject to control by any superior authority other than the law. The court also examined other tax code provisions related to withholding, self-employment, unemployment, and employment taxes, finding that they were consistent with or not inconsistent with the holding that federal judges are not employees under IRC section 219. The court further noted that even if judges were considered employees, the mechanisms under the Judicial Code for judges to receive payments after separation from active service did not constitute a retirement plan as contemplated by IRC section 219(b)(2)(A)(iv).

### **Practical Implications**

This decision clarified that federal judges can contribute to IRAs and deduct those contributions, providing them with an additional means of saving for retirement. Legal practitioners should note that the classification of individuals as employees or officers under the tax code can significantly impact their eligibility for certain tax benefits. The ruling also underscores the distinction between officers and employees, which could affect how similar cases are analyzed in the future, particularly those involving public officials and their tax treatment. Subsequent legislative changes have altered the scope of IRA deductions, but the principle established in *Porter* remains relevant for understanding the unique status of federal judges under the tax code.