

Hornaday v. Commissioner, 81 T. C. 830 (1983)

Income from a consulting contract constitutes self-employment income subject to tax, even if no services are performed, when the contract requires availability for service.

Summary

James M. Hornaday, after retiring from Guilford Mills, Inc. , entered into a consulting contract that obligated him to provide services upon request. Despite not being called upon to perform services during the years 1977-1979, he received \$40,000 annually. The Tax Court held that these payments were self-employment income, subject to tax, because Hornaday remained in the consulting business due to his ongoing obligation to be available for service. The court rejected the argument that a consultant must offer services to multiple clients to be considered in a trade or business, emphasizing the terms of the contract and the taxpayer's readiness to perform as key factors.

Facts

James M. Hornaday founded Guilford Mills, Inc. , in 1946 and retired in 1971. Upon retirement, he entered into a consulting contract with Guilford Mills, agreeing to provide consulting services for life as needed. The contract provided \$40,000 annually, a car every two years, and an office. Although Hornaday provided services in the early years of the contract, Guilford Mills did not request his services from 1977 to 1979. He did not offer consulting services to any other entity during this period.

Procedural History

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in Hornaday's self-employment taxes for 1977, 1978, and 1979, totaling \$1,304, \$1,434, and \$1,855 respectively. Hornaday petitioned the U. S. Tax Court, which upheld the Commissioner's determination that the consulting payments were self-employment income subject to tax.

Issue(s)

1. Whether payments received by James M. Hornaday under a consulting contract with Guilford Mills, Inc. , constituted self-employment income subject to tax under section 1401 of the Internal Revenue Code?

Holding

1. Yes, because under the terms of the consulting contract, Hornaday was obligated to provide services upon request, and his readiness to perform constituted engagement in a trade or business, making the payments self-employment income.

Court's Reasoning

The court's decision was based on the interpretation of what constitutes a "trade or business" under section 1402 of the Internal Revenue Code. The court rejected the requirement that a consultant must offer services to multiple clients, as established in previous cases like *Barrett v. Commissioner*, and instead adopted a facts-and-circumstances approach from *Ditunno v. Commissioner*. The court found that Hornaday's obligation to be available for service, as stipulated in the contract, and his readiness to perform, despite not being called upon, indicated he remained in the consulting business. The court also considered policy considerations favoring broad coverage for social security purposes, supporting the inclusion of such income as self-employment income. The court noted that Hornaday's inactivity was due to forces outside his control, not abandonment of the business.

Practical Implications

This decision clarifies that income from a consulting contract can be treated as self-employment income subject to tax, even if no services are actually performed, provided the contract requires the consultant to be available for service upon request. This ruling affects how similar consulting agreements should be analyzed for tax purposes, particularly in cases where payments continue despite no active service. It may influence the structuring of retirement and consulting agreements, encouraging clarity on the nature of services expected and the conditions under which payments are made. The decision also impacts later cases by establishing a precedent that readiness to perform under a contract can be sufficient to constitute engagement in a trade or business, broadening the scope of what may be considered self-employment income.