

## ***McClendon v. Commissioner, 74 T. C. 1 (1980)***

Divorce agreements control dependency exemptions for children regardless of actual support provided.

### **Summary**

In *McClendon v. Commissioner*, the U. S. Tax Court ruled that the terms of a divorce decree govern the allocation of dependency exemptions for children, even if the noncustodial parent does not fully comply with the decree. Nicki McClendon, the custodial parent, sought exemptions for two of her three children, but the divorce agreement awarded these exemptions to her ex-husband, Olen. Despite Olen's partial non-compliance with support payments, the court upheld the agreement's terms, emphasizing the importance of certainty in divorce-related financial arrangements. This decision underscores the binding nature of divorce agreements on tax exemptions and the limited discretion courts have in altering such arrangements.

### **Facts**

Nicki A. McClendon and Olen McClendon divorced in 1974, with Nicki receiving custody of their three children. The divorce decree incorporated an agreement that Olen would pay \$200 monthly in child support and claim dependency exemptions for two of the children, Angelia and Tracy, while Nicki would claim the exemption for their third child, Michael. In 1975, Olen paid \$2,100 in child support, but did not fully meet the decree's obligations. Despite providing over half of the support for Angelia and Tracy, Nicki claimed exemptions for all three children on her 1975 tax return, which the IRS disallowed for Angelia and Tracy.

### **Procedural History**

The IRS issued a notice of deficiency disallowing the exemptions for Angelia and Tracy. Nicki McClendon filed a petition with the U. S. Tax Court challenging the deficiency. The Tax Court, after reviewing the case, upheld the IRS's determination and ruled in favor of the Commissioner.

### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether the custodial parent, Nicki McClendon, is entitled to dependency exemptions for two of her children despite the divorce decree awarding these exemptions to the noncustodial parent, Olen McClendon.

### **Holding**

1. No, because the divorce decree clearly allocated the dependency exemptions for Angelia and Tracy to Olen McClendon, and he provided the requisite support as per the decree, satisfying the statutory requirements.

## **Court's Reasoning**

The court applied Section 152(e)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code, which allows the noncustodial parent to claim dependency exemptions if the divorce decree or agreement so provides and the noncustodial parent provides at least \$600 in support. The court found that the divorce decree unambiguously awarded the exemptions for Angelia and Tracy to Olen, and his payments of \$2,100, presumed to be equally divided among the three children, met the support threshold. The court rejected Nicki's argument that Olen's non-compliance with the decree should negate his right to the exemptions, emphasizing that the statute's purpose is to provide certainty in financial planning post-divorce. The court cited *Kotlowski v. Commissioner* for the presumption of equal allocation of support payments and *Sheeley v. Commissioner* to support the view that the statute's language is absolute and does not allow for implied exceptions based on non-compliance.

## **Practical Implications**

This decision reinforces the importance of clear terms in divorce agreements regarding tax exemptions, as courts will enforce these agreements strictly. Attorneys should advise clients to carefully consider and negotiate dependency exemption allocations in divorce proceedings, understanding that these terms will be binding regardless of subsequent compliance with other aspects of the decree. For taxpayers, this means that even if they bear the majority of a child's support, they may not claim the exemption if the divorce decree assigns it elsewhere. Subsequent cases like *Meshulam v. Commissioner* have followed this precedent, indicating its enduring impact on how dependency exemptions are treated in the context of divorce. This ruling also highlights the need for potential amendments to divorce decrees if circumstances change, as judicial discretion to alter exemptions post-decree is limited.