

Black v. Commissioner, 69 T. C. 505 (1977)

I. R. C. § 214's requirements for child care expense deductions do not violate constitutional protections against discrimination based on marital status, sex, or interference with family relationships.

Summary

In *Black v. Commissioner*, the Tax Court upheld the constitutionality of I. R. C. § 214's requirements for deducting child care expenses, ruling that they did not discriminate unconstitutionally based on marital status, sex, or interfere with family relationships. The petitioners, Carlin and Virginia Black, argued against the section's limitations on adjusted gross income, the cap on deductions, and the joint filing requirement for married couples. The court, following its precedent in *Nammack v. Commissioner*, found that these provisions met the rational basis test for economic legislation and did not infringe on constitutional rights. This decision reinforced the principle that tax laws, even if perceived as inequitable, must be addressed through legislative reform rather than constitutional challenges.

Facts

Carlin J. Black and Virginia H. Black, a married couple from New York, sought to deduct child care expenses incurred while both were employed full-time during 1972 and 1973. They had two children under 15 years old during these years. The Blacks filed joint federal income tax returns but were denied the deductions by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue due to the requirements under I. R. C. § 214, which included an income limitation, a cap on monthly deductions, and a mandate for married couples to file jointly. The Blacks challenged the constitutionality of these requirements.

Procedural History

The Blacks filed petitions with the United States Tax Court challenging the Commissioner's disallowance of their child care expense deductions. The court considered the case in light of its prior decision in *Nammack v. Commissioner*, which had upheld similar provisions of § 214 against constitutional challenges. The Tax Court issued its decision on December 21, 1977, affirming the Commissioner's position and ruling in favor of the respondent.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the requirement in I. R. C. § 214 that taxpayers reduce their allowable child care expense deductions by one-half the amount by which their adjusted gross income exceeds \$18,000 constitutes unconstitutional discrimination.
2. Whether the \$400 monthly cap on child care expense deductions under I. R. C. § 214 constitutes unconstitutional discrimination.
3. Whether the requirement under I. R. C. § 214 that married persons must file a

joint return to obtain the child care expense deduction constitutes unconstitutional discrimination based on marital status, sex, or interference with family relationships.

4. Whether I. R. C. § 214's provisions infringe upon the free exercise of religion as protected by the First Amendment.

Holding

1. No, because the income limitation is rationally based and does not invidiously discriminate, as upheld in *Nammack v. Commissioner*.

2. No, because the cap on deductions is rationally based and does not invidiously discriminate, as upheld in *Nammack v. Commissioner*.

3. No, because the joint filing requirement is rationally based and does not invidiously discriminate on the basis of marital status, sex, or interfere with family relationships, as upheld in *Nammack v. Commissioner*.

4. No, because the provisions do not improperly infringe on the free exercise of religion, as they have a secular purpose and do not target religious practices.

Court's Reasoning

The Tax Court applied the rational basis test to evaluate the constitutionality of I. R. C. § 214's requirements, as these were economic legislation. The court found that the provisions were rationally related to legitimate government interests and did not invidiously discriminate. It cited *Nammack v. Commissioner*, where similar challenges to § 214 were rejected, and noted that subsequent Supreme Court cases did not undermine this precedent. The court emphasized that even if the provisions might lead to perceived inequities, such issues were more appropriately addressed through legislative reform rather than constitutional challenges. The court also rejected the argument that the provisions violated the First Amendment's protection of free exercise of religion, stating that the law's secular purpose did not target religious practices. Key policy considerations included maintaining the integrity of the tax system and the government's broad discretion in economic regulation. The court noted that the Second Circuit's affirmance of *Nammack* further supported its decision.

Practical Implications

This decision reinforces the principle that tax laws must meet only the rational basis test for constitutionality, even if they result in perceived inequities. Practitioners should advise clients that challenges to tax provisions on constitutional grounds are unlikely to succeed unless they can show clear and invidious discrimination. The ruling may influence how similar tax provisions are analyzed and defended in future litigation. It also underscores the need for taxpayers to address perceived inequities in tax laws through legislative channels rather than judicial ones. Subsequent cases have continued to apply this reasoning, with courts generally upholding tax provisions against constitutional challenges unless they can be shown to be

irrational or discriminatory.