Thompson v. Commissioner, 66 T. C. 1024 (1976)

Prepaid interest deductions are disallowed when transactions are found to be shams or not bona fide, and cash basis taxpayers cannot deduct prepaid interest not paid in the taxable year.

Summary

In Thompson v. Commissioner, the court addressed whether certain payments by Del Cerro Associates could be deducted as prepaid interest or were part of sham transactions. Del Cerro Associates had claimed deductions for prepaid interest on land purchase notes and a subsequent write-off of unamortized interest upon merger with another entity. The court held that the transactions involving the McAvoy investors were not bona fide, thus disallowing interest deductions on related notes. Additionally, Del Cerro, as a cash basis taxpayer, could not deduct prepaid interest not paid in the relevant year. The decision highlights the importance of substance over form in tax transactions and the rules governing interest deductions for cash basis taxpayers.

Facts

In 1965, Del Cerro Associates purchased land from Sunset International Petroleum Corp. for $1,456,000 in promissory notes and paid $350,000 in cash as prepaid interest. Subsequently, Del Cerro granted Lion Realty Corp. , a Sunset subsidiary, an exclusive right to resell the property. In another transaction, McAvoy, a shell corporation, bought land from Sunset for $700,000 in notes and paid $650,000 in cash as prepaid interest and a financing fee. McAvoy’s stock was then sold to investors for $6,800,000 in notes. In 1966, McAvoy merged into Del Cerro, which assumed the investors’ notes and claimed a $1,070,000 interest deduction, including $245,000 for unamortized prepaid interest from McAvoy. In 1967, Del Cerro claimed a $6,254,500 deduction for the write-off of intangible assets related to terminated development agreements with Sunset.

Procedural History

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the claimed deductions by Del Cerro and the individual partners. The case was heard by the United States Tax Court, where the petitioners challenged the disallowance of deductions for prepaid interest and the write-off of intangible assets.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the $350,000 payment by Del Cerro Associates to Sunset International Petroleum Corp. in 1965 represented deductible prepaid interest or was in substance a loan to Sunset.
2. Whether amounts deducted by petitioners in 1965 as purported interest on personal promissory notes, given in payment for the purchase of stock, should be

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disallowed because the transactions giving rise to such notes were not bona fide.
3. Whether certain amounts paid by Del Cerro Associates in 1966 are properly deductible as interest.
4. Whether Del Cerro Associates is entitled to a deduction in its 1967 return for a write-off of a purported intangible asset designated as “Contractual Rights and Interests. “

Holding

1. Yes, because the court found that the transaction’s form as prepaid interest was supported by the documents and the possibility that Sunset might not repurchase the property, thus the payment was not clearly a loan.
2. No, because the court determined that the transactions involving the McAvoy stock were a sham, and thus the payments could not be considered bona fide interest.
3. No, because the court held that the $6,800,000 of alleged indebtedness assumed by Del Cerro from the McAvoy investors was a sham, and Del Cerro, as a cash basis taxpayer, could not deduct the $245,000 of prepaid interest not paid in 1966.
4. No, because the court found that the “Contractual Rights and Interests” had no tax basis and therefore could not be written off as a loss.

Court’s Reasoning

The court applied the principle that tax consequences must reflect the substance of transactions, not merely their form. For the 1965 Del Cerro transaction, the court found that the payment could be considered prepaid interest because there was no clear obligation for Sunset to repurchase the property, and Del Cerro retained some risk of ownership. The McAvoy transactions were deemed a sham because the resale of McAvoy’s stock at a significant markup shortly after acquisition indicated a lack of bona fides. The court also noted that the development agreements with Sunset did not add significant value beyond the land itself. For the 1966 interest deductions, the court applied the rule that cash basis taxpayers can only deduct interest when paid, not when accrued. The “Contractual Rights and Interests” written off in 1967 were disallowed because they had no tax basis. The court emphasized the importance of having a tax basis for loss deductions and that the loss of potential profit is not deductible.

Practical Implications

This case underscores the need for transactions to have economic substance to qualify for tax deductions. Practitioners must ensure that transactions are bona fide and not structured solely for tax benefits. The ruling clarifies that cash basis taxpayers cannot deduct prepaid interest not paid in the taxable year, affecting how such transactions should be structured and reported. The decision also impacts how intangible assets are treated for tax purposes, emphasizing the need for a clear tax basis. Subsequent cases have cited Thompson when addressing the deductibility of

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interest and the treatment of sham transactions. Businesses and tax professionals must carefully consider these principles when planning and executing transactions to avoid disallowed deductions.

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