

Industrial Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 66 T. C. 272 (1976)

Loans acquired by banks just before a merger are not considered ‘representative’ of the bank’s ordinary portfolio for purposes of calculating bad debt reserve deductions if the loans revert to the acquiring bank post-merger.

Summary

In this case, Industrial Valley Bank (IVB) sold substantial loan participations to Lehigh Valley Trust Co. and Doylestown Trust Co. shortly before merging with them. The banks claimed these loans as part of their bad debt reserve calculations, seeking to increase their net operating loss carrybacks. The Tax Court held that these loans were not ‘representative’ of the banks’ ordinary portfolios under Rev. Rul. 68-630, as they were held only briefly before reverting to IVB upon merger. However, a \$200,000 loan by Doylestown to an IVB subsidiary was deemed representative due to its business purpose. The court also ruled that the banks did not act negligently, as they relied on professional tax advice.

Facts

In December 1968, Lehigh Valley Trust Co. (Lehigh) acquired \$17.5 million in loan participations from IVB, and in June 1969, Doylestown Trust Co. (Doylestown) acquired \$2 million in loan participations and made a \$200,000 direct loan to Central Mortgage Co., an IVB subsidiary. These transactions occurred just before Lehigh and Doylestown merged into IVB, with the loans reverting to IVB upon merger. The banks claimed these loans increased their bad debt reserve deductions, leading to larger net operating loss carrybacks. IVB had recommended these transactions to the banks, assuring them of their legality and tax benefits.

Procedural History

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue challenged the banks’ claimed bad debt reserve deductions, asserting the loans were not representative of their ordinary portfolios. The case was submitted to the U. S. Tax Court fully stipulated under Rule 122. The court considered whether the Commissioner abused his discretion in denying the deductions and whether negligence penalties should apply.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the Commissioner abused his discretion in denying Lehigh and Doylestown additions to their bad debt reserves for 1968 and 1969, respectively, attributable to certain loan transactions.
2. Whether part of the underpayment of taxes by Lehigh and Doylestown was due to negligence or intentional disregard of the rules and regulations.

Holding

1. No, because the loan participations acquired by Lehigh and Doylestown just before their mergers with IVB were not 'representative' of their ordinary portfolios under Rev. Rul. 68-630, as they were held only briefly before reverting to IVB.
2. No, because IVB reasonably relied on qualified professional tax advice in undertaking the transactions, thus avoiding negligence penalties under sec. 6653(a).

Court's Reasoning

The court applied Rev. Rul. 68-630, which requires loans to be 'representative' of a bank's ordinary portfolio to be included in bad debt reserve calculations. The court found that the pre-merger loan participations were not representative of Lehigh's and Doylestown's ordinary portfolios because they were acquired just before the banks' extinction through merger and reverted to IVB shortly thereafter. The court rejected IVB's argument that the loans were prospectively representative of IVB's more aggressive lending practices, emphasizing that the issue was whether the loans were representative of the acquired banks' operations. The court distinguished Doylestown's \$200,000 loan to Central Mortgage Co. as representative due to its business purpose of providing funds IVB could not lend directly. On the negligence issue, the court found that IVB's reliance on expert tax advice from Jeanne Zweig was reasonable, thus avoiding sec. 6653(a) penalties.

Practical Implications

This decision clarifies that loans acquired by banks just before a merger and held only briefly before reverting to the acquiring bank are not considered 'representative' for bad debt reserve purposes. Banks planning mergers should carefully consider the timing and nature of loan transactions to avoid disallowed deductions. The case also reinforces that reasonable reliance on expert tax advice can protect against negligence penalties, even if the tax position ultimately fails. Subsequent cases have applied this ruling to similar pre-merger transactions, and it has influenced how banks structure their loan portfolios and tax planning around mergers.