

***Estate of Ludwig Neugass, Deceased, Herbert Marx, Jacques Coe, Jr. , and Chase Manhattan Bank, N. A. , Executors, Petitioners v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Respondent, 65 T. C. 188 (1975)***

A surviving spouse's election to enlarge a life estate to absolute ownership does not qualify for the marital deduction if the power to appoint is not exercisable in all events.

### **Summary**

Ludwig Neugass's will granted his wife, Carolyn, a life estate in his art collection, with a subsequent life estate to their daughter, and the remainder to a foundation. Carolyn was given the option to elect absolute ownership of any item within six months of Ludwig's death. She elected to take absolute ownership of certain artworks, and the estate claimed a marital deduction for their value. The Tax Court held that Carolyn's interest was terminable at the time of Ludwig's death because she only had a life estate initially, and her subsequent election to enlarge her interest did not relate back to the date of death. Therefore, the value of the artworks could not be included in the marital deduction.

### **Facts**

Ludwig Neugass died testate on February 24, 1969, leaving his wife, Carolyn, a life estate in his art collection. The will also provided that within six months of his death, Carolyn could elect to take absolute ownership of any item in the collection. On July 2, 1969, Carolyn elected to take absolute ownership of certain artworks. The estate included the value of these artworks in its marital deduction on the federal estate tax return filed on May 22, 1970.

### **Procedural History**

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued a notice of deficiency disallowing \$337,329. 88 of the claimed marital deduction, representing the value of the artworks Carolyn elected to take. The estate petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.

### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether the value of the artworks, over which Carolyn Neugass elected to take absolute ownership, qualifies for the marital deduction under section 2056(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.

### **Holding**

1. No, because at the time of Ludwig Neugass's death, Carolyn Neugass had only a life estate in the artworks, which is a terminable interest, and her subsequent election to take absolute ownership did not relate back to the date of death.

## **Court's Reasoning**

The Tax Court reasoned that the determination of whether an interest is terminable is made at the moment of the decedent's death. At that time, Carolyn had only a life estate in the art collection, which is a terminable interest under section 2056(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code. The court rejected the estate's argument that Carolyn's election to take absolute ownership of certain items related back to the date of death, citing that she already had a life estate and was merely enlarging her interest. The court also held that Carolyn's power to elect absolute ownership was not exercisable "in all events" as required by section 2056(b)(5), because it had to be exercised within six months of Ludwig's death. The court distinguished this case from *Estate of George C. Mackie*, where the surviving spouse had a choice between alternatives at the time of the decedent's death.

## **Practical Implications**

This decision clarifies that a surviving spouse's power to enlarge a life estate to absolute ownership does not qualify for the marital deduction if the power is not exercisable in all events. Estate planners must draft wills carefully to ensure that any power given to a surviving spouse to convert a life estate to full ownership is exercisable in all events to qualify for the marital deduction. This case also highlights the importance of the timing of the surviving spouse's interest at the moment of the decedent's death in determining the applicability of the marital deduction. Subsequent cases, such as *Estate of Opal v. Commissioner*, have continued to apply the "in all events" requirement strictly.