# Hoeme v. Commissioner, 63 T. C. 18 (1974)

Summary judgment is generally inappropriate for resolving the issue of whether payments are alimony or property settlement due to the presence of genuine issues of material fact, particularly regarding the intent of the parties.

### Summary

In Hoeme v. Commissioner, the U. S. Tax Court denied a motion for summary judgment regarding the tax treatment of payments made to Norma Hoeme by her former husband under their divorce agreement. The court found genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether the payments were alimony or a property settlement, necessitating a trial. The court also rejected a motion for partial summary judgment to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner, emphasizing that summary judgments are inappropriate for evidentiary matters.

### Facts

Norma R. Hoeme received payments from her former husband, Ronald O. Stonestreet, following their divorce in August 1969. The payments, totaling \$2,400 annually, were stipulated in a "Property Settlement Agreement" incorporated into the divorce decree. The agreement required Ronald to pay Norma \$2,500 immediately, \$200 per month for 30 months, and then \$150 per month until the total reached \$25,000. The IRS determined these payments were taxable to Norma as alimony, while taking an inconsistent position in Ronald's case, denying him a deduction for the same payments.

### **Procedural History**

The Hoemes filed a motion for summary judgment in the U. S. Tax Court to determine whether the payments were taxable as alimony or nontaxable as a property settlement. The Commissioner opposed the motion. The court denied the motion for summary judgment and also denied a motion for partial summary judgment that sought to shift the burden of proof to the Commissioner.

#### Issue(s)

1. Whether the payments made to Norma Hoeme by her former husband constitute alimony or property settlement, suitable for resolution by summary judgment.

2. Whether the burden of proof should be shifted to the Commissioner due to inconsistent positions taken in related cases.

### Holding

1. No, because there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding the intent of the parties, which requires a trial on the merits.

2. No, because the Commissioner's determination had a rational basis, and partial

summary judgment on evidentiary matters like burden of proof is not contemplated under the rules.

# **Court's Reasoning**

The court applied the principle that summary judgment is inappropriate when genuine issues of material fact exist. It emphasized that the intent of the parties in divorce agreements is crucial in determining whether payments are alimony or property settlement, and this intent is typically a factual issue best resolved at trial. The court cited precedents where summary judgment was denied in similar cases, noting that the inferences from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Regarding the burden of proof, the court held that the Commissioner's inconsistent positions in related cases did not negate the rational basis for the determination, and summary judgment on evidentiary matters was not allowed. The court quoted from U. S. v. Diebold, Inc. , emphasizing the need to view inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.

## **Practical Implications**

This decision underscores the importance of trial in resolving disputes over the nature of payments in divorce settlements, particularly when intent is at issue. Attorneys should be cautious about seeking summary judgment in such cases, as the court is likely to find that genuine issues of material fact exist. The ruling also clarifies that the burden of proof cannot be shifted through partial summary judgment motions, affecting how attorneys strategize in tax disputes involving divorce agreements. Practically, this case suggests that parties to a divorce should clearly articulate their intent regarding payments to avoid prolonged legal disputes over their tax treatment. Later cases have continued to follow this principle, emphasizing the need for a full trial to assess the factual circumstances surrounding divorce agreements.