# Collins v. Commissioner, 54 T. C. 1656 (1970)

Payments labeled as interest are not deductible if the underlying transaction creating the debt is a sham lacking economic substance.

#### Summary

James and Dorothy Collins attempted to offset their 1962 income tax liability from an Irish Sweepstakes win by purchasing an apartment building with a contract designed to generate a large interest deduction. The contract included a prepayment of interest, but the Tax Court found this to be a sham transaction lacking economic substance, disallowing the deduction. The court also disallowed a \$250 attorney's fee as a capital expenditure but allowed a \$4,511 accountant's fee for tax services under IRC Section 212.

### Facts

James and Dorothy Collins won \$140,100 in the Irish Sweepstakes in 1962. To offset their tax liability, they purchased an apartment building from Miles P. Shook and Harley A. Sullivan, who held a security interest in the property. The purchase contract, orchestrated by their accountant, included a \$19,315 down payment and a \$139,485 balance payable in installments with interest at 8. 4%. The Collinses prepaid \$44,299. 70 in interest for five years, claiming it as a deduction. The accountant's figures were arbitrary, designed to ensure the sellers received at least \$63,000 cash immediately. Shook reported the prepaid interest as income but had no tax liability due to a rental loss.

### **Procedural History**

The Commissioner disallowed the \$44,299. 70 interest deduction and most of the \$4,761 in legal and accounting fees, allowing only \$300. The Collinses petitioned the U. S. Tax Court, which held that the interest payment was not deductible as it was part of a sham transaction, disallowed the attorney's fee as a capital expenditure, but allowed the accountant's fee under IRC Section 212.

### Issue(s)

1. Whether the \$44,299. 70 paid by the Collinses as prepaid interest is deductible under IRC Section 163?

2. Whether the \$250 paid to the attorney for legal services related to the acquisition of the apartment building is deductible under IRC Section 212 or a capital expenditure under IRC Section 263?

3. Whether the \$4,511 paid to the accountant for tax services is deductible under IRC Section 212 or a capital expenditure under IRC Section 263?

# Holding

1. No, because the installment debt and prepayment-of-interest provisions in the purchase contract were shams and lacked economic substance, creating no genuine indebtedness to support the interest deduction.

2. No, because the fee was a capital expenditure related to the acquisition of income-producing property.

3. Yes, because the fee was for tax advice and services, deductible under IRC Section 212 as an ordinary and necessary expense.

## **Court's Reasoning**

The court applied the principle that substance must control over form, referencing *Gregory v. Helvering*. It found that the Collinses' accountant arbitrarily calculated the figures in the purchase contract to ensure the sellers received their desired cash amount while creating a facade of indebtedness. The court cited *Knetsch v. United States* and other cases to support its conclusion that no genuine debt existed to support the interest deduction. The attorney's fee was disallowed as it was part of the cost of acquiring the property, a capital expenditure under IRC Section 263. The accountant's fee was allowed as it was for tax advice and services, directly related to the Collinses' tax situation and deductible under IRC Section 212. The court emphasized that the accountant's work was aimed at minimizing the Collinses' tax liability, not merely facilitating the purchase.

## **Practical Implications**

This decision reinforces the importance of economic substance in tax transactions. Practitioners must ensure that transactions have a legitimate business purpose beyond tax avoidance. The ruling affects how interest deductions are analyzed, requiring a genuine debt obligation. It also clarifies the deductibility of professional fees, distinguishing between those related to acquisition (capital expenditures) and those for tax advice (ordinary expenses). Subsequent cases have applied this principle to disallow deductions in similar sham transactions. Businesses and individuals must carefully structure their transactions to withstand scrutiny under the economic substance doctrine.