

### **33 T.C. 608 (1959)**

A non-exempt cooperative association may exclude patronage dividends from gross income, even if paid to an agent of the patron, provided the agent is acting on behalf of the patron in the underlying business transaction and the cooperative has a preexisting obligation to distribute the dividends.

#### **Summary**

The Producers Gin Association, a non-exempt cooperative, sought to exclude patronage dividends from its gross income. These dividends were paid to landlords who acted as agents for their tenant sharecroppers. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue argued that the dividends were not excludable because they were not directly paid to the tenants. The Tax Court held that the dividends were excludable because the landlords were acting as agents for their tenants in all relevant transactions, and the cooperative had a preexisting legal obligation to distribute the dividends. The court reasoned that payment to an agent is equivalent to payment to the principal, thus satisfying the requirements for excluding patronage dividends from gross income.

#### **Facts**

Producers Gin Association (petitioner) was a non-exempt cooperative ginning cotton for its members and patrons. Landlords and sharecroppers jointly owned some cotton. The landlords delivered the cotton to the petitioner, declaring the joint ownership. The petitioner issued ginning tickets and computed patronage dividends separately for the landlords and tenants. The landlords signed contracts as agents for their tenants. The petitioner paid patronage dividends to the landlords, providing statements detailing the amounts attributable to each tenant. The Commissioner disallowed portions of the rebates, arguing they weren't paid directly to the tenants.

#### **Procedural History**

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in the petitioner's income tax for the fiscal years ending in 1952, 1953, 1954, and 1955, disallowing certain patronage dividend exclusions. The petitioner challenged the deficiencies, leading to the case before the United States Tax Court.

#### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether a non-exempt cooperative association can exclude from its gross income, as patronage dividends, amounts paid to landlords on business done for their tenants, where the landlords act as agents for the tenants.

#### **Holding**

1. Yes, because the landlords acted as agents for their tenants in all relevant

transactions, and the patronage dividends qualified for exclusion as true patronage dividends, even though not paid directly to the tenants.

### **Court's Reasoning**

The court established that the petitioner was organized and operated as a cooperative association. The court cited established law indicating that patronage dividends paid by a non-exempt cooperative could be excluded from its gross income if they were made pursuant to a preexisting legal obligation, and were distributed out of profits from transactions with the patrons. The court found that the landlords were agents for their tenants and that the petitioner was aware of the joint ownership of the cotton. The landlords delivered the cotton, received payments, and were responsible for the ginning costs on behalf of the tenants. The court relied on the contract language, the practical arrangements, and the landlords' actions to conclude the agency relationship existed. Citing established case law, the court noted, "To qualify for exclusion, however, the allocation of earnings must have been made pursuant to a preexisting legal obligation." The court held that because the landlords were acting as agents, payment to them was equivalent to payment to the tenants. As the court noted, "the landlord acted not only for himself, but as agent for his tenants."

### **Practical Implications**

This case clarifies how non-exempt cooperatives should treat patronage dividends when dealing with agents of their patrons. It confirms that payments to agents, acting on behalf of their principals, can qualify for exclusion from gross income. This requires a clearly defined agency relationship in the underlying business transaction. This has implications for agricultural cooperatives, particularly those dealing with sharecropping arrangements or similar business structures. The case underscores the importance of formal contracts and clear documentation to establish the agency relationship. Later cases dealing with the application of patronage dividends would likely reference this case to the extent that the facts are applicable.