

32 T.C. 1171 (1959)

The value of a trust established before March 4, 1931, is excluded from a decedent's gross estate under Internal Revenue Code Section 811(c)(1)(B), even if the decedent later released rights associated with the trust, provided the transfer of the trust was completed prior to that date.

Summary

The Estate of Robert J. Cuddihy challenged the Commissioner of Internal Revenue's determination that a portion of a trust's principal should be included in the decedent's gross estate for tax purposes. The trust was established by the decedent's wife in 1926, with the decedent retaining a life interest in the income. The court held that the trust's principal was not includible in the decedent's estate under Section 811(c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 because the trust was created before March 4, 1931, and the decedent had subsequently relinquished all rights to the trust income. The court found that, even if the pre-1931 exclusion did not apply, the decedent had completely divested himself of any interest in the trust before his death.

Facts

Robert J. Cuddihy died on December 22, 1952. In 1926, Cuddihy and his wife created reciprocal inter vivos trusts, each transferring shares of stock in Funk & Wagnalls Company. The trusts were substantially identical, providing income to the spouse for life, with the remainder to the issue. Cuddihy was to receive half the income from his wife's trust during his life. In 1941, Cuddihy and his wife resigned as trustees. In 1946, Cuddihy released his right to consent to the termination of his wife's trust. In 1949, he assigned any reversionary interest to a charitable organization. Also in 1949, Cuddihy released his right to receive income from his wife's trust in exchange for a lump sum payment from his children, after which the income was distributed to his children. The value of the stock was \$40 per share at the time of Cuddihy's death.

Procedural History

The Commissioner determined a deficiency in the estate tax, asserting that a portion of the trust's principal should have been included in the decedent's gross estate. The estate contested this determination in the United States Tax Court.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the value of one-half of the principal of the Emma F. Cuddihy Trust is includible in the decedent's gross estate under Section 811(c)(1)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
2. Whether Section 811(c)(1)(B) is applicable to the trust in question, considering

the trust was created before March 4, 1931.

Holding

1. No, because the transfer was made prior to March 4, 1931.
2. No, because the decedent had relinquished all rights in the trust, including any rights to income and possession or enjoyment of the property.

Court's Reasoning

The court addressed two primary arguments. First, the court found that Section 811(c)(1)(B) should not apply because the trust was created before March 4, 1931. The court reasoned that the last sentence of Section 811(c) explicitly excluded transfers made before that date, regardless of whether the decedent later released certain powers. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that the transfer was not complete until the decedent released his right to join in the termination of the trust. The court held that the critical point for the application of the statute was the time the legal title transferred to the trustee. Second, even if the pre-March 4, 1931, exclusion did not apply, the court determined that Section 811(c)(1)(B) was not applicable because Cuddihy had fully divested himself of any interest in the trust before his death. The court found that the sale of the income interest was not a mere acceleration of income but a complete relinquishment of rights, supported by the fact that the trustees were parties to the transaction and that the decedent no longer had any rights to income after the sale. The court distinguished the case from *Smith v. United States*, where the court found the transfer incomplete because the trust was revocable.

Practical Implications

This case underscores the importance of the date a trust is established when considering estate tax liability. For trusts created before March 4, 1931, the estate tax implications under Section 811(c)(1)(B) are limited. This case provides a clear analysis of the scope of "transfer" under the tax code, emphasizing that a completed transfer of legal title, rather than the subsequent release of control, is key in determining the applicability of the estate tax provisions. The decision suggests that if a life interest is sold or transferred for value, it is not considered the same as retaining the right to income. This case helps in distinguishing when the grantor has truly relinquished their rights to the asset. Lawyers should analyze the specifics of trust documents and the actions taken by the grantor to determine the appropriate estate tax treatment, and in the case of pre-1931 trusts, ensure they correctly interpret the interplay between transfer dates and retained interests.