31 T.C. 596 (1958)

When a divorce agreement or decree designates a specific portion of periodic payments for child support, that portion is not considered alimony for tax purposes, even if the payments are made to the custodial parent.

Summary

In Metcalf v. Commissioner, the U.S. Tax Court addressed whether payments made by a divorced husband to his former wife were taxable as alimony or were non-taxable child support. The court examined a separation agreement and subsequent court decrees to determine if any portion of the payments were "earmarked" for the support of the children. The court held that because the agreement, when considered as a whole, clearly indicated a portion of the payments was for child support, that portion was not taxable to the wife nor deductible by the husband. The case clarifies how to interpret divorce agreements and decrees to distinguish between alimony and child support for tax purposes, emphasizing the intent of the parties as evidenced by the complete agreement and related court actions.

Facts

Arthur Metcalf and Mary Thomson (formerly Metcalf) divorced in 1950. Before the divorce decree, they signed an agreement detailing support obligations. The agreement stated Arthur would pay Mary $150 per week for the support of her and their five children. The agreement further specified that the weekly payments would be reduced by $25 as each child reached age 21, died, married, or became self-supporting. The divorce decree, issued three days later, did not explicitly reference the agreement, but it ordered Arthur to pay $150 per week for the support of Mary and the children. Later, the court increased the weekly payments to $175. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in both Arthur's and Mary's income taxes, disagreeing with the couple's initial reporting of payments. Arthur claimed deductions for alimony paid, while Mary reported alimony as income. The Commissioner determined the payments were largely taxable to Mary and disallowed Arthur's dependency exemptions for the children. The issue turned on the characterization of the payments under the 1939 Internal Revenue Code.

Procedural History

After the Commissioner issued notices of deficiency to both Arthur and Mary, each filed a petition in the U.S. Tax Court. The Tax Court consolidated the cases for trial because they involved similar questions of law and fact regarding the tax treatment of the payments. The Commissioner argued that the payments were primarily alimony, fully taxable to Mary, and, therefore, deductible by Arthur to a smaller degree. Arthur and Mary argued that a specific portion of the payments was for child support, rendering that portion non-taxable to Mary and non-deductible by Arthur. The Tax Court examined the agreement and related court documents to

© 2025 SCOTUSreports.com. All rights reserved.

resolve the dispute.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the separation agreement, executed before the divorce decree, survived the divorce and continued to govern the financial obligations between Arthur and Mary.

2. Whether the weekly payments made by Arthur to Mary, or a portion thereof, constituted alimony (taxable to Mary and deductible by Arthur) or child support (non-taxable to Mary and non-deductible by Arthur).

Holding

1. Yes, because the agreement's provisions and the parties' actions demonstrated its continued validity even after the divorce decree.

2. The court found that $6,500 of the $7,950 paid by Arthur in 1951 constituted child support and the remaining $1,450 was alimony.

Court's Reasoning

The court applied the tax laws regarding alimony and child support, specifically Section 22(k) and Section 23(u) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939. The court emphasized that the key issue was whether the agreement or subsequent decrees specifically designated a portion of the payments for child support. The court considered the agreement "as a whole," noting that the agreement specified that the payments would decrease by $25 per child upon certain events, such as the child reaching age 21. The court found that this language, coupled with the parties' conduct (e.g., Arthur claiming dependency exemptions for the children and Mary reporting only a portion of the payments as income), indicated that the parties intended $25 of each weekly payment to be for the support of each child. The court concluded that this amount was therefore not alimony.

The court stated, "We think it is clear that the agreement here involved was intended to and did survive the divorce decree…we must look to the agreement as well as the various court proceedings to determine whether an amount or portions of the payments were specifically designated or earmarked for the support of the children."

Practical Implications

This case is vital for attorneys and tax professionals advising clients on divorce settlements. The Metcalf case highlights the importance of:

- Clearly specifying in separation agreements and divorce decrees the allocation of payments between alimony and child support to ensure the correct tax

© 2025 SCOTUSreports.com. All rights reserved.

treatment.
- Considering the agreement as a whole when interpreting its terms.
- Understanding that while a decree may not incorporate an entire agreement, the agreement itself may still be the operative instrument.
- Using unambiguous language to designate support payments for children to avoid them being taxed as alimony.

Later cases frequently cite Metcalf to support the principle that substance, not form, governs the characterization of payments. The court’s emphasis on the intent of the parties, as reflected in the overall structure of the agreement, remains relevant.

© 2025 SCOTUSreports.com. All rights reserved.