

29 T.C. 71 (1957)

A decree of divorce “ca mensa et thoro” (legal separation) is final for federal income tax purposes, even if an appeal is pending, unless the appeal has the effect of vacating or annulling the decree under applicable state law.

Summary

In 1951, Kenneth Sullivan and his wife were granted a divorce “ca mensa et thoro” (legal separation). Both parties appealed the divorce decree. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decree in April 1952. Sullivan filed a joint tax return for 1951. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the wife’s personal exemption on the joint return, arguing that the Sullivans were legally separated under a decree of divorce as of the end of 1951 and therefore not eligible to file a joint return. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner, holding that under Maryland law, the appeal did not vacate the divorce decree. The court affirmed the deficiency, finding that the parties were legally separated at the end of the tax year, thus precluding joint filing status.

Facts

Kenneth Sullivan and Carrie Sullivan were married on May 7, 1931. In June 1950, Carrie filed suit for a limited divorce and custody of their children, with Kenneth filing a cross-bill seeking similar relief. On October 15, 1951, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted a divorce “ca mensa et thoro” to Kenneth and awarded custody of the children to Carrie. Both parties appealed this decree before January 1, 1952. Neither party filed an appeal bond. On March 15, 1952, the Sullivans filed a joint federal income tax return for the year 1951. The Court of Appeals of Maryland affirmed the Circuit Court’s decree on April 3, 1952.

Procedural History

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in Kenneth Sullivan’s 1951 income tax, disallowing the wife’s personal exemption on the joint return. The Tax Court reviewed the Commissioner’s determination.

Issue(s)

1. Whether Kenneth Sullivan and Carrie Sullivan were legally separated under a decree of divorce at the end of 1951, despite the pending appeal.

Holding

1. Yes, because under Maryland law, the appeal of the divorce decree did not vacate or annul the decree retroactively to the end of 1951; therefore, the Sullivans were considered legally separated at the end of the tax year.

Court's Reasoning

The court first established that a decree of divorce “ca mensa et thoro” (legal separation) in Maryland is a judicial separation that alters marital status. Citing *Garsaud*, the court noted that Congress intended such a decree to be sufficient to prevent joint filing. The court emphasized that the determination of marital status is governed by state law and therefore turned to Maryland law. The court then analyzed the effect of an appeal on a Maryland divorce decree, as interpreted by the Maryland Annotated Code. The court found that, without a bond, an appeal does not vacate the decree but merely stays its execution. As the appeal of the divorce decree did not vacate it as of the end of the year, the court held that the parties were still considered legally separated under the divorce decree at the end of 1951. The court noted that Maryland law provides that the decree remains in effect until and unless the appellate court reverses the decree. As the decree was affirmed in April 1952, it was deemed valid for 1951. “The second rule is that an individual legally separated (although not absolutely divorced) from his spouse under a decree of divorce or of separate maintenance shall not be considered as married.”

Practical Implications

This case highlights the importance of state law in determining marital status for federal tax purposes. Attorneys must research how state law treats the finality of divorce decrees and the effect of appeals, especially in jurisdictions where divorce decrees may be interlocutory or subject to automatic stays. This case directly impacts the tax implications of divorce or separation, and affects when a married couple can file jointly, and what exemptions they can claim. Practitioners must know the procedural rules in the jurisdiction to determine if the decree is final. This case emphasizes that a pending appeal does not automatically negate the impact of a divorce decree; rather, the effect of the appeal depends on specific state laws and how it alters the decree's legal effect. Later courts would reference this case when determining the tax implications of divorce.