

## **25 T.C. 398 (1955)**

Section 107(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which provides for the averaging of income over a longer period, applies to an attorney's fees for a specific piece of litigation even if he later performs other services for the same client or estate, so long as the 80% condition of the statute is met for the specific litigation. This is especially true where the attorney was initially retained by the client in a personal capacity before becoming the attorney for the estate, and his fee was contingent on success in the litigation.

### **Summary**

The U.S. Tax Court addressed whether two attorneys, Irving and Chase, could apply Section 107(a) of the 1939 Internal Revenue Code to fees received from an estate. Chase, as executor, sued the widow of the estate for declaratory relief. Irving, an attorney, was hired by Chase to handle the litigation, with compensation contingent on a successful outcome. Later, Irving became the attorney for the estate. The court had to decide whether the fees received by the attorneys qualified for income averaging under Section 107(a). The Court held that Irving's fees for the specific litigation qualified, whereas Chase's did not, because Irving's services in the litigation were considered separately from his later role as attorney for the estate, thus meeting the 80% requirement for the specific litigation.

### **Facts**

George L. Leiter died in 1947. His will named Chase and decedent's daughter as executors. A dispute arose concerning the nature of the property left by the decedent. Chase, as executor, filed a lawsuit against the widow and his co-executor. Irving was subsequently hired by Chase on a contingent basis to handle the litigation. Irving prepared the case for trial and was formally associated as attorney. Later, Irving was substituted as attorney for the executors. The litigation was successful. The Probate Court approved compensation for Chase and Irving for extraordinary services. Chase received \$22,500, and Irving received \$45,000. Both were paid in 1952. Irving also performed other services for the estate. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied both Irving and Chase the application of Section 107(a) for the 1952 payments, asserting the 80% condition of the statute was not met.

### **Procedural History**

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in the income tax of Irving, his wife, and the Chases for 1952. The cases were consolidated. The parties submitted the matter to the Tax Court on stipulated facts.

### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether Irving and Chase could apply Section 107(a) to payments they

received in 1952 from the estate for services rendered in connection with the litigation, in light of the 80% condition.

## **Holding**

1. Yes, as to Irving; No, as to Chase, because although the payment to Irving was less than 80 per centum of the total compensation paid to him by the estate, his services in connection with the specific litigation were considered separately from his other services rendered as attorney for the estate.

## **Court's Reasoning**

The court analyzed whether the compensation received by Irving and Chase could be considered under Section 107(a). The court noted that the 1939 code, Section 107(a), allows for income averaging if at least 80% of the total compensation for personal services covering a period of thirty-six calendar months or more is received in one taxable year. The court found that Chase's services, being performed in his capacity as an executor, didn't qualify because the compensation received was less than 80% of the total received by him in his role as executor. For Irving, however, the court distinguished his services. He was first hired by Chase on a contingent basis specifically for the litigation, prior to becoming the attorney for the estate. The court held that Irving's right to compensation arose from his representation of Chase in that particular lawsuit, rather than from his later role as the attorney for the estate. Because of the unique circumstances, the court determined that Section 107(a) was applicable to Irving because his fee related to the litigation was considered a separate service. The court cited *\*Estate of Marion B. Pierce\**, 24 T.C. 95, as support.

## **Practical Implications**

This case highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing the nature of services performed, especially in situations involving attorneys or other professionals who may wear multiple hats for a client or estate. The decision emphasizes that the 80% requirement of Section 107(a) can be satisfied if a specific set of services, meeting the time and compensation thresholds, is considered separately from other services provided. The case suggests that attorneys should document their services and compensation carefully, particularly when engaging in multiple engagements with the same client. This can allow for potential income averaging under section 107 if there is a specific, discrete engagement that meets the statutory requirements. For the IRS, it highlights the importance of examining the nature of compensation for each particular service rendered, and not simply looking at the totality of compensation received over a period of time from a client.