***Isfalt v. Commissioner*, 19 T.C. 505 (1952)**

Payments made by a divorced husband to his former wife, as specified in a divorce decree or a related instrument, are considered installment payments and not deductible alimony if a principal sum is explicitly stated, even if the payments may terminate upon the wife's death or remarriage.

Summary

The case concerned whether payments made by a husband to his former wife, as stipulated in their separation agreement and divorce decree, qualified as deductible alimony under the Internal Revenue Code. The court held that the payments were installment payments because a specific principal sum was stated in the agreement and decree, even though the payments could cease if the wife died or remarried. This determination hinged on the interpretation of whether a definite principal sum existed, as explicitly stated in the agreement and divorce decree, thereby classifying the payments as installments rather than periodic alimony.

Facts

John A. Isfalt and Acie Isfalt entered into a separation and property settlement agreement, which was incorporated into their divorce decree. The agreement stipulated that Isfalt would pay Acie $24,000 in monthly installments of $200 over ten years, with payments ceasing upon her death or remarriage. The divorce decree mirrored this payment schedule. Isfalt deducted the monthly payments as alimony on his tax returns. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed these deductions, leading to a tax deficiency determination.

Procedural History

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a tax deficiency. Isfalt contested this in the Tax Court. The Tax Court ruled in favor of the Commissioner, holding the payments were installment payments and therefore not deductible.

Issue(s)

Whether the payments made by the petitioner to his former wife, pursuant to the separation agreement and divorce decree, are periodic payments within the meaning of section 22 (k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939.

Holding

No, because the court held that the payments were installment payments, not periodic payments, because the agreement and divorce decree specified a principal sum of $24,000.

Court's Reasoning

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The court examined Section 22(k) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, which governs the tax treatment of alimony. This section defines “periodic payments” as includible in the recipient’s income and deductible by the payor. Installment payments discharging a principal sum specified in the decree or instrument are explicitly excluded from being treated as periodic payments. The court emphasized that, in this case, the agreement and divorce decree explicitly stated a principal sum of $24,000. Although payments might cease upon the wife’s death or remarriage, this contingency did not negate the existence of a specified principal sum. The court distinguished this situation from cases where the principal sum was not clearly defined or was ascertainable only through implication. The court followed its previous decisions, rejecting the Second Circuit’s holding in a similar case, because here the principal sum was explicitly stated in the agreement and the decree.

Practical Implications

This case clarifies that if a divorce decree or separation agreement explicitly states a principal sum to be paid, payments are treated as installments, regardless of contingencies that might end the payments. This means the payor cannot deduct these payments as alimony, and the recipient does not include them in income, unless the payments are made over a period longer than 10 years. Practitioners must carefully draft separation agreements and divorce decrees to ensure that payment structures align with the client’s tax goals. If the intent is to create deductible alimony, the agreement should avoid specifying a principal sum. This case underscores the importance of precise language when drafting financial provisions in divorce settlements and how the presence or absence of a specific amount can alter the tax treatment of payments.

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