

## **22 T.C. 1137 (1954)**

Payments received in settlement of a lawsuit for rescission of a stock sale based on fraud are treated as proceeds from the sale of a capital asset, resulting in capital gain rather than ordinary income.

### **Summary**

The United States Tax Court addressed whether an \$8,000 settlement received by Albert Goldsmith, who sued to rescind a stock sale due to fraud, constituted ordinary income or capital gain. The Commissioner argued the payment was “severance pay,” but the court found the payment was directly related to the settlement of Goldsmith’s suit for rescission of his stock sale. The Court held the payment represented payment for the stock, taxable as capital gain. The ruling focused on the substance of the transaction and the underlying nature of the lawsuit’s claims, rather than the defendant’s designation of the payment.

### **Facts**

In 1939, Goldsmith transferred machinery to General Gummed Products, Inc. (Products) and received 30 shares of stock. In 1940, he sold these shares to his brothers-in-law for \$3,000. Later, Goldsmith discovered that his brothers-in-law allegedly misrepresented the company’s financial state to induce the sale. In 1947, he sued his brothers-in-law, Daniel Rothschild, and Products in New York State Supreme Court seeking rescission of the stock sale, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation. The lawsuit sought the rescission of the sale and damages. The case was settled for \$8,000 during trial, but the defendants attempted to characterize the payment as “severance pay” for tax purposes. The IRS determined the settlement was ordinary income.

### **Procedural History**

Goldsmith filed a tax return treating the \$8,000 settlement as a capital gain. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency, arguing the settlement was taxable as ordinary income. Goldsmith petitioned the U.S. Tax Court. The Tax Court sided with Goldsmith, deciding that the settlement was related to the rescission of stock and constituted capital gain.

### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether the \$8,000 received by the petitioner in settlement of the litigation constitutes ordinary income, as the respondent has determined, or proceeds from the sale of capital assets, as reported by the petitioner.

### **Holding**

1. Yes, the \$8,000 received by the petitioner is considered proceeds from the sale of

capital assets, resulting in capital gain.

### **Court's Reasoning**

The court looked to the substance of the settlement, not the form. The court referenced the precedent set in *Sutter v. Commissioner*, 21 T.C. 130 (1953) holding that the nature of the claim settled determines the tax treatment. Since the lawsuit involved the rescission of a stock sale due to fraud, the settlement was considered a payment related to the disposition of a capital asset (the stock). The court dismissed the defendants' attempt to characterize the settlement as severance pay. It found that the characterization of the payment as severance pay was not made in good faith. They highlighted that the defendants' designation of "severance pay" was a screen for undisclosed motives and that the primary purpose of the settlement was to avoid further legal costs. The court also noted that the fact that the payment originated from the corporation, instead of the individuals who committed the alleged fraud, further supported the court's view of the substance of the transaction.

### **Practical Implications**

This case reinforces the principle that the tax treatment of a settlement is determined by the nature of the underlying claim. For attorneys, it means carefully analyzing the basis of a lawsuit to determine whether settlement proceeds should be treated as ordinary income or capital gain. In cases involving the sale of assets or claims of fraud related to asset sales, settlements are likely to be considered capital gains. This case is a reminder of the importance of focusing on the substance of a transaction for tax purposes. It also emphasizes that the court will look beyond the label a party assigns to a payment to determine its true nature and tax implications. The case also demonstrates that courts may scrutinize the intent and motives of parties when determining the character of a payment, particularly if there is evidence that the designation of the payment was made to obtain a tax advantage.