

Nowels v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1961-246

In tax law, the substance of a transaction, rather than its form or recitals in a contract, determines the tax consequences, especially when evaluating the allocation of purchase price to a covenant not to compete.

Summary

In this dissenting opinion in a Tax Court case, Judge Johnson argues that the majority erred in accepting the contractual allocation of \$50 per share to a covenant not to compete in a stock sale. The dissent contends that the evidence shows the sellers sold stock and a covenant for a lump sum of \$200 per share, and the separate valuation of the covenant was a tax-motivated artifice inserted at the buyer's request. The dissent emphasizes that the true substance of the transaction should govern tax treatment, not merely the form of the contract.

Facts

Sellers agreed to sell their stock in a company along with a covenant not to compete to buyers for a lump sum of \$200 per share. A written contract reflecting this agreement was prepared and signed by the sellers. Before signing, the buyer, Hoiles, asked if the sellers would agree to allocate \$50 per share to the covenant not to compete and \$150 to the stock, stating it would be "tax-wise" for the buyers. The sellers, unaware of the tax implications, agreed. This allocation was added to the contract. The dissent argues this allocation did not reflect the actual negotiation or the true value of the covenant.

Procedural History

This is a dissenting opinion in the Tax Court. The majority opinion, against which this dissent is written, presumably upheld the Commissioner's assessment based on the contractual allocation.

Issue(s)

1. Whether the Tax Court erred in finding that \$50 per share was genuinely paid for a covenant not to compete, based solely on a contractual recital, when the evidence indicated the allocation was primarily for tax purposes and did not reflect the substance of the transaction.

Holding

1. No, according to the dissenting judge, because the Tax Court should have looked beyond the contractual form to the actual substance of the transaction and found that no separate consideration was genuinely paid for the covenant not to compete.

Court's Reasoning

Judge Johnson, dissenting, argues that the recital in the contract allocating value to the covenant not to compete is not conclusive. The dissent emphasizes the following points:

- The allocation was inserted at the buyer's request for tax reasons, with the sellers unaware of the tax consequences and without meaningful consideration or negotiation of this separate value.
- Prior negotiations and the initial agreement were for a lump sum price for the stock and covenant combined, not separate valuations.
- The \$150 per share valuation for the stock was below its real, market, or profit-earning value, suggesting the allocation was artificial.
- The \$50 value for the covenant was unsupported by evidence, especially considering only one seller (Nowels) was likely to compete, and he was subsequently hired by the buyers.
- The dissent cites precedent, including *Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.*, 324 U.S. 331, stating, "To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax policies of Congress."
- The dissent concludes that the substance of the transaction was a sale of stock with an ancillary covenant, for a single lump sum, and no part of the consideration was genuinely paid separately for the covenant.

Practical Implications

This dissenting opinion highlights the enduring principle of "substance over form" in tax law. It serves as a reminder to legal professionals and tax advisors that contractual recitals, especially those related to tax allocations, are not automatically binding. Courts will look to the underlying economic reality of a transaction. In cases involving covenants not to compete, this dissent suggests that to ensure the tax allocation is respected, there must be evidence of genuine negotiation and independent value assigned to the covenant, separate from the sale of a business itself. This case emphasizes the importance of documenting the true intent and economic substance of transactions, not just relying on contractual language designed primarily for tax advantages. Later cases would likely cite this dissent to argue against artificial allocations in contracts when the economic substance suggests otherwise.