***16 T.C. 656 (1951)***

Section 126 of the Internal Revenue Code is a remedial provision enacted to benefit a decedent regarding their final income tax return, applying to income earned by the decedent but not yet received at death, while Section 162 refers to income earned by the estate during administration, not applying to items considered income solely due to Section 126.

**Summary**

The Estate of Ralph R. Huesman received a cash bonus owed to the decedent at the time of his death. The executors included this amount in the estate's income tax return under Section 126 but then deducted it under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, arguing it was distributed to a beneficiary. The Tax Court held that the deduction under Section 162 was incorrect because Section 126 is intended to address income earned by the decedent before death, while Section 162 addresses income earned by the estate, not items considered income solely because of Section 126. Therefore, the court disallowed the deduction.

**Facts**

Ralph R. Huesman died testate on May 3, 1944, leaving a substantial estate. At the time of his death, Desmond's, a retail corporation where Huesman served as president, owed him $80,517 as a bonus for services rendered before his death. This amount was included in the federal estate tax return. The will placed all of Huesman's property in trust, directing the trustees to pay a percentage of the trusteed property to various organizations, including Loyola University. The executors sought court instructions regarding the distribution of the bonus to Loyola University as a partial satisfaction of its legacy. The court ordered the executors to receive the $80,517 from Desmond's and then pay it to the testamentary trustees, who would then pay it to Loyola University. In the estate's accounting records, the $80,517 was treated as principal.

**Procedural History**

The executors of Huesman's estate filed an income tax return for the fiscal year ending April 30, 1945, reporting the $80,517 bonus as income under Section 126 of the Internal Revenue Code. They then deducted this amount under Section 162, along with the estate tax attributable to the bonus. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency, disallowing the deduction under Section 162. The case was brought before the United States Tax Court.

**Issue(s)**

Whether the executors of the estate were correct in deducting $80,517 under Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, representing a bonus owed to the decedent at the time of his death, which was included as income under Section 126

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but then distributed to a beneficiary.

## Holding

No, because Section 126 is a remedial provision designed to alleviate hardship related to income earned by a decedent but not received until after death, whereas Section 162 pertains to income earned by the estate during its administration, and the bonus was part of the estate's corpus, not income earned by the estate.

## Court's Reasoning

The court reasoned that the bonus owed to the decedent was part of the corpus of his estate. While Section 126 requires that the amount collected on such a claim be reported as income of the estate, this does not change the fundamental character of the asset, which was fixed at the date of the decedent's death. The court noted that the executors transferred part of the decedent's residuary estate to the trustees, who then distributed it to Loyola University. Loyola University received corpus of the trust, not income. The court emphasized that the bonus was the only cash asset of the trust at the time of distribution. The court distinguished the case from situations where capital gains are distributed by an estate and are not deductible as income payments under Section 162 if the will or state law designates such gains as corpus. The court referred to the legislative history of Section 126, noting it was added to the Code to alleviate hardship caused by including accrued income in the decedent's final return.

## Practical Implications

This case clarifies the distinction between income in respect of a decedent (IRD) under Section 126 and income earned by the estate under Section 162. It emphasizes that the character of an asset as either corpus or income is determined at the date of the decedent's death, regardless of subsequent tax treatment. This distinction is crucial for estate planning and administration, particularly in determining the deductibility of distributions to beneficiaries. It informs how similar cases involving IRD should be analyzed, emphasizing the importance of tracing the origin and nature of the distributed assets and examining the terms of the will and applicable state law to determine whether the distribution constitutes income or corpus. Subsequent cases have relied on Huesman to distinguish between distributions of corpus versus estate income.

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