***16 T.C. 385 (1951)***

A distribution to a shareholder is considered a distribution in complete liquidation for tax purposes if the corporation demonstrates a manifest intention to liquidate, a continuing purpose to terminate its affairs, and its activities are directed and confined to that end, even if the liquidation process is lengthy due to the nature of the assets.

**Summary**

The Tax Court addressed whether a distribution received by a shareholder from a corporation in 1942 was taxable as an ordinary dividend or as a distribution in complete liquidation. The corporation had been under court-ordered liquidation since 1919, managed by assignees. The court held that the distribution was a part of complete liquidation because the corporation had a continuing purpose to liquidate, even though the process was lengthy due to the illiquid nature of its assets (primarily timber and coal lands) and ongoing legal claims. The assignee made reasonable efforts to dispose of assets and did not add new non-liquid assets.

**Facts**

Charles Fearon (the decedent) owned shares of the Louisville Property Company. The company was ordered to liquidate in 1919 following a suit by minority shareholders. The United States Trust Company became the assignee, tasked with selling the assets, paying debts, and distributing the remainder to shareholders. The Trust Company sold most assets by 1925 but retained mineral and coal rights. In 1935, H.C. Williams replaced the Trust Company as assignee. Williams continued to sell assets, including land and mineral rights, but complete liquidation was protracted due to difficulty selling coal and timber lands. Distributions were made to shareholders in 1940 and 1942.

**Procedural History**

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in the decedent’s income tax, arguing that the 1942 distribution was an ordinary dividend, not a distribution in complete liquidation as the decedent reported. The case was brought before the United States Tax Court to resolve the dispute.

**Issue(s)**

Whether the distribution received by the decedent in 1942 from the Louisville Property Company was taxable as an ordinary dividend or as a distribution in complete liquidation under Section 115(c) of the Internal Revenue Code.

**Holding**

No, the distribution was not an ordinary dividend. The court held that the

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distribution was taxable as a distribution in complete liquidation because the company demonstrated a continuing purpose to liquidate its assets, and its activities were directed towards that goal, despite the length of the liquidation period.

**Court's Reasoning**

The court emphasized that a corporate liquidation involves winding up affairs by realizing assets, paying debts, and distributing profits. Citing *T. T. Word Supply Co., 41 B.T.A. 965, 980*, the court stated that a liquidation requires "a manifest intention to liquidate, a continuing purpose to terminate its affairs and dissolve the corporation, and its activities must be directed and confined thereto." The court found that the liquidation of Property Company was initiated by a court order, not a self-imposed decision. The court considered Williams' efforts to sell the remaining assets, particularly the difficult-to-sell Bell County lands. Williams would have preferred to sell the land outright but was unable to find a buyer. The court noted that Williams did not expand the non-liquid assets and that liquid assets increased over time. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the Whitley Circuit Court maintained continuous supervision over Williams' activities. The court acknowledged the lengthy period of liquidation but reasoned that the assets were not readily marketable, and there were unsettled claims. Quoting *R. D. Merrill Co., 4 T.C. 955, 969*, the court stated that the liquidator has the discretion to effect a liquidation in such time and manner as will inure to the best interests of the corporation's stockholders.

**Practical Implications**

This case provides guidance on determining whether a corporate distribution qualifies as a complete liquidation for tax purposes, especially when the liquidation process is lengthy. Attorneys should focus on demonstrating the corporation's intent to liquidate, the continuing efforts to sell assets, and the absence of activities inconsistent with liquidation. The case shows that the length of the liquidation period is not necessarily determinative, particularly when assets are illiquid and subject to legal claims. Later cases may cite *Fearon* to argue that a distribution should be treated as a liquidating distribution, even if the process takes many years, as long as the company can show a continuing intention to wind up its affairs in an orderly fashion and maximize value for its shareholders.

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