

## ***Estate of Oliver Johnson, 10 T.C. 655 (1948)***

The determination of whether a transfer was made in contemplation of death hinges on the decedent's dominant motive, assessed subjectively by examining various factors present at the time of the transfer.

### **Summary**

The Tax Court addressed whether transfers made by the decedent, Oliver Johnson, four years before his death should be included in his gross estate as transfers made in contemplation of death under Section 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The court considered various factors, including the decedent's age, health, the time elapsed between the transfer and death, the proportion of property transferred, the decedent's disposition, and the existence of a testamentary scheme. Ultimately, the court concluded that the dominant motive behind the transfers was to escape the burdens of property management, not the contemplation of death, and thus the transfers should not be included in the gross estate.

### **Facts**

Oliver Johnson, at age 85, retired as a farmer and moved to Southern California. During the depression years, he acquired several rental properties, which he found burdensome to manage. He expressed a desire to give away these properties to his children to avoid the management responsibilities. On March 3, 1939, at age 90, Johnson transferred a significant portion of his property to his children. He was described as being in extraordinarily good health for his age, active, alert, and proud of his vitality. He died four years later. His will was executed four months after the transfers. The donees were his children, who were also beneficiaries of his will. He had a history of making gifts to his children in the same proportions.

### **Procedural History**

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue sought to include the value of the transferred properties in Oliver Johnson's gross estate, alleging they were made in contemplation of death. The Estate of Oliver Johnson petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination. The Tax Court reviewed the case to determine the decedent's motive behind the transfers.

### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether the transfers made by the decedent on March 3, 1939, should be included in his gross estate under Section 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code as transfers made in contemplation of death.

### **Holding**

1. No, because the dominant motive of the decedent in making the transfers was

to escape the burdens of managing the properties, not the contemplation of death.

### **Court's Reasoning**

The court emphasized that the ultimate question is the decedent's dominant motive, a subjective inquiry. It listed various circumstances to consider, including age, health, interval between transfer and death, proportion of property transferred, the decedent's disposition, and the existence of a testamentary scheme. The court acknowledged that Johnson's advanced age and the fact that the donees were his children (natural objects of his bounty) suggested a contemplation of death motive. However, it found more compelling the evidence indicating life-associated motives: his good health, cheerful disposition, the four-year interval between transfer and death, the lack of a pre-existing testamentary scheme, his long-established gift-making policy, and his desire to escape the burdens of property management. The court gave significant weight to the evidence of Johnson's exceptional health and vigor for his age, quoting testimony that he "didn't look his age by 12 or 15 years" and that "he was going to be here a long time." The court concluded that Johnson's desire to shed responsibilities and enjoy his retirement in Southern California was a more compelling motive than the thought of death. Citing *United States v. Wells*, 282 U.S. 102, the court stated, "\* \* \* age in itself can not be regarded as furnishing a decisive test, for sound health and purposes associated with life, rather than death, may motivate the transfer."

### **Practical Implications**

This case underscores the importance of a subjective, fact-intensive inquiry when determining whether a transfer was made in contemplation of death. It illustrates that advanced age alone is not determinative if other factors suggest life-associated motives. Attorneys should gather comprehensive evidence about the decedent's health, disposition, lifestyle, and reasons for making the transfer. The case highlights the significance of documenting the decedent's contemporaneous statements and actions to support a finding of life-associated motives. It also clarifies that even transfers to natural objects of bounty can be deemed not in contemplation of death if a dominant life-associated motive is established. This case continues to be cited in estate tax litigation involving transfers made within three years of death, providing a framework for analyzing the decedent's intent.