Pittsburgh Steel Foundry Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 1025 (1951)

For excess profits tax purposes, a deduction is considered abnormal if it is wholly unlike other deductions of the same type taken by the taxpayer in the base period and arises under unique circumstances.

Summary

Pittsburgh Steel Foundry Corp. sought to disallow a bad debt deduction from 1937 when calculating its excess profits tax for later years. The deduction stemmed from advances made to protect an investment in an athletic club after the corporation purchased the club's property at a foreclosure sale following a defaulted account receivable. The Tax Court held that this deduction was abnormal because the corporation had never made similar investments or advances, and the deduction arose from unique circumstances, entitling the corporation to disallow it when calculating excess profits tax.

Facts

Pittsburgh Steel Foundry Corp. ("Pittsburgh") had a $243,938.30 account receivable from an athletic club for the erection of a structural steel frame. Upon the club's default, Pittsburgh purchased the property at a mechanic's lien foreclosure sale for $517,259.89, including the amount owed. Pittsburgh then sold a one-half interest in the property for $300,000. The co-owners formed a corporation and transferred the property to it, each receiving half the shares. Pittsburgh made advances to the corporation to protect its investment. In 1937, Pittsburgh claimed a loss deduction related to this investment, of which the Commissioner allowed $81,607.66 as a bad debt deduction.

Procedural History

The Commissioner initially disallowed a portion of Pittsburgh's loss deduction in 1937, later allowing $81,607.66 as a bad debt. In calculating its excess profits tax for later years, Pittsburgh sought to disallow this 1937 deduction as abnormal. The Commissioner argued the loss was a normal business expense, but the Tax Court ruled in favor of Pittsburgh, finding the deduction abnormal.

Issue(s)

Whether the $81,607.66 bad debt deduction allowed to Pittsburgh in 1937 was a deduction of a class abnormal for the taxpayer under Section 711(b)(1)(J)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code, thus warranting its disallowance in determining excess profits net income for base period years.

Holding

Yes, because the $81,607.66 deduction was wholly unlike other bad debt deductions

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taken by Pittsburgh in the base period years and arose under unique conditions and circumstances, justifying its disallowance in calculating excess profits net income.

Court’s Reasoning

The Tax Court reasoned that the original trade account receivable was effectively paid when Pittsburgh purchased the athletic club property. The subsequent advances were not typical collection expenses, but rather investments made to protect its ownership interest. The court emphasized that Pittsburgh was in the business of steel fabrication, not operating athletic clubs or advancing funds for such operations. The court found this situation analogous to *Green Bay Lumber Co., 3 T.C. 824*, stating that deductions need not fall into single, rigid classes. Because the character of the $81,607.66 deduction was unlike other bad debt deductions normally taken by Pittsburgh, and because it arose under peculiar circumstances, it was deemed an abnormal deduction under Section 711(b)(1)(J)(i) of the Internal Revenue Code. The court distinguished cases cited by the Commissioner, noting they were factually dissimilar.

Practical Implications

This case provides guidance on determining what constitutes an

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