

## **9 T.C. 594 (1947)**

A grantor's transfer of assets into a trust is not includable in their gross estate for estate tax purposes where the grantor did not retain the right to income from the property, even if the trust provides for the potential use of income or principal for the grantor's spouse, absent a specific requirement to do so.

### **Summary**

The Tax Court addressed whether the value of stock transferred into a trust by the decedent should be included in his gross estate for tax purposes. The trust provided income to the decedent's wife for life, with a provision allowing the trustees to use the principal for her support if her income was insufficient. The Commissioner argued that the decedent retained the right to have the trust income used to discharge his legal obligation to support his wife. The court held that because the trust did not mandate that the income be used for the wife's support and the decedent was not entitled to the income, the trust assets were not includable in the gross estate.

### **Facts**

The decedent, Clayton William Sherman, created a trust in 1935, transferring 1,316 shares of Seaman Paper Co. stock to it. The trustees were Sherman's son, son-in-law, and wife, Georgie Carr Sherman. The trust deed directed the trustees to pay the income to Georgie for life. If the trustees deemed her income insufficient for support, they could use the principal, but not while the decedent was alive and competent without his consent. The decedent consistently supported his wife until his death in 1941. The trust property initially produced no income, and the wife received no distributions until after the decedent's death.

### **Procedural History**

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a deficiency in the estate tax, asserting that the value of the trust corpus should be included in the gross estate. The Estate of Clayton William Sherman, through its executrix, Elizabeth Sherman Carroll, petitioned the Tax Court for a review of the Commissioner's determination.

### **Issue(s)**

Whether the value of the stock transferred into the trust should be included in the decedent's gross estate under Section 811(c) or (d) of the Internal Revenue Code, based on the decedent allegedly retaining a life estate or the power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust.

### **Holding**

No, because the decedent did not retain the right to income from the property, nor

did he possess a power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust within the meaning of Section 811(c) or (d) of the Internal Revenue Code.

### **Court's Reasoning**

The court reasoned that the trust instrument did not require the income to be used for the wife's support; it merely provided that the trustees *could* use the income or principal for her support if they deemed her other income insufficient. The court distinguished this from a situation where the decedent retained the right to have trust income used to discharge his legal obligations, citing *Douglas v. Willcuts*, 296 U.S. 1. The court emphasized that no restriction was placed on the wife's use of the trust income. The court also dismissed the Commissioner's argument that the transfer was intended to take effect at or after the decedent's death, noting that the trustees could invade the corpus both before and after his death. Finally, the court found that the decedent's required consent for the trustees to use the principal during his lifetime did not constitute a power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust.

### **Practical Implications**

This case clarifies that for a trust to be included in a decedent's gross estate based on retained interest, there must be a direct, legally enforceable right retained by the grantor. A discretionary power given to trustees to use trust assets for the beneficiary's support, absent a mandate or restriction requiring such use, is insufficient to trigger estate tax inclusion. This decision highlights the importance of careful drafting of trust instruments to avoid unintended estate tax consequences. It provides guidance for estate planners, emphasizing that the grantor's intent and the specific language of the trust document are critical in determining whether a retained interest exists. Later cases applying this ruling focus on discerning whether the trust language creates an absolute right or merely a discretionary power regarding the distribution of income or principal.