Granite Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 621 (1948)

The delivery of a promissory note does not constitute "payment" within the meaning of Section 24(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, which disallows deductions for unpaid expenses between related parties if not paid within a specific timeframe.

Summary

Granite Trust Co. sought to deduct compensation owed to Miller, a controlling stockholder, as a business expense. The Commissioner disallowed the deduction under Section 24(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, arguing that the compensation was not "paid" within the prescribed timeframe. Granite Trust argued that the delivery of promissory notes constituted payment. The Tax Court sided with the Commissioner, holding that "paid" means actual payment in cash or its equivalent, and the mere delivery of a promissory note is insufficient.

Facts

Granite Trust Co. accrued compensation on its books for Miller, a controlling shareholder, for services rendered in 1940. The exact authorization of the compensation was not documented in corporate records. Notes dated December 30, 1940, and January 1, 1941, were issued to Miller on January 1, 1941, in satisfaction of the accrued compensation. These notes were not paid until December 31, 1942.

Procedural History

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed Granite Trust's deduction for the compensation paid to Miller. Granite Trust Co. appealed to the Tax Court, contesting the Commissioner's determination.

Issue(s)

Whether the delivery of promissory notes to a controlling shareholder constitutes "payment" of compensation within the meaning of Section 24(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, thereby allowing the taxpayer to deduct the compensation as a business expense.

Holding

No, because the word "paid" as used in Section 24(c)(1) means paid in actuality in cash or its equivalent, and the giving of one's own note for one's obligation is not such payment.

Court's Reasoning

The Tax Court reasoned that the purpose of Section 24(c) was to prevent taxpayers from manipulating deductions by accruing expenses to related parties who would

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defer the corresponding income. The court emphasized that the word “paid” in Section 24(c)(1) must be interpreted in light of this purpose. The court stated, “It is our view that the word ‘paid’ as used in section 24(c)(1) means paid in actuality in cash or its equivalent and that the giving of one’s own note for one’s obligation is not such payment.” The court distinguished between “constructive receipt” and actual payment, noting that includibility in the payee’s income does not automatically equate to deductibility for the payor. Quoting *Helvering v. Price, 309 U.S. 409*, the court emphasized that “the mere giving of the note and collateral not constituting a ‘payment in cash or its equivalent.'”

Practical Implications

This case clarifies the meaning of “paid” under Section 24(c)(1), establishing that a mere promise to pay, such as issuing a promissory note, is insufficient for a deduction. Taxpayers must ensure actual payment in cash or its equivalent within the specified timeframe to deduct expenses owed to related parties. This ruling prevents accrual-basis taxpayers from deducting expenses without a corresponding cash outlay, impacting tax planning for closely held businesses and related-party transactions. It reinforces the importance of documenting and substantiating actual payments, not just accruals, for tax deduction purposes. Later cases have consistently upheld this interpretation of “paid” under Section 24(c)(1) and its successors.

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