3 T.C. 1274 (1944)

Compensation received by a trustee for services, whether calculated based on income or principal under state law, is considered a single compensation for federal income tax purposes when determining eligibility for income averaging under Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Summary

Harry Civiletti, a testamentary trustee, sought to apply Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code to commissions he received in 1940 for managing trust principal, aiming to spread the tax burden over the years he served as trustee since 1929. The Tax Court ruled against Civiletti, holding that his annual compensation for managing trust income, combined with the 1940 principal commissions, meant he did not receive at least 95% of his total compensation in 1940, thus disqualifying him from using Section 107. The court reasoned that despite separate calculations for income and principal commissions under New York law, the trusteeship constituted a single employment.

Facts

In 1929, Civiletti became a trustee for two trusts established under Adelaide E. Harris's will. Each year, Civiletti accounted to the life beneficiary and received compensation under New York law for receiving and paying out trust income. From 1929 to 1940, Civiletti received at least $17,000 in income commissions. In 1940, the trustees filed an intermediate accounting with the Surrogate's Court, and Civiletti was awarded $31,025.12 for receiving and paying out trust principal since 1929.

Procedural History

Civiletti reported the $31,025.12 in his 1940 income tax return and sought to apportion it over the years 1929-1940 under Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue denied this treatment, leading to a deficiency assessment. Civiletti then petitioned the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency.

Issue(s)

Whether Civiletti was entitled to the advantage afforded by Section 107 of the Internal Revenue Code in computing his 1940 income tax liability, specifically whether he received at least 95% of his total trustee compensation in 1940.

Holding

No, because Civiletti received compensation for his services as trustee annually for managing trust income, the lump sum payment in 1940 for managing principal did

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not constitute at least 95% of his total compensation for the entire period of his service as trustee.

Court’s Reasoning

The court focused on whether Civiletti met the requirements of Section 107(b) of the Internal Revenue Code, which required that at least 95% of the compensation be paid upon completion of the services. Civiletti argued that the New York statute (Surrogate’s Court Act, sec. 285, subd. 7) treated income and principal commissions as separate compensation for separate services. The court rejected this argument, stating that while the New York statute provides a method for calculating compensation, it does not change the fundamental nature of the trusteeship as a single employment. The court quoted *In re Wolfe’s Estate, 300 N. Y. S. 312*, stating “Commissions are intended as compensation for service. While commissions are currently catalogued as receiving and paying out commissions, the actual fact is that the whole body of commissions is designed to be compensation for the whole body of administration of its trust estate.” Because Civiletti had received annual income commissions, he did not receive at least 95% of his total compensation in 1940. The court found it unnecessary to decide whether the 1940 payment was made “only on completion of such services” because the 95% requirement was not met.

Practical Implications

This case clarifies that, for federal income tax purposes, compensation for services rendered over multiple years should be viewed holistically, even if state law provides for separate calculations or payments for different aspects of those services. Legal practitioners must consider all forms of compensation received over the relevant period when advising clients on eligibility for income averaging or similar tax benefits. This ruling emphasizes that the substance of the employment relationship, rather than the form of payment, is the key factor in determining eligibility for such tax provisions. It serves as a caution against relying solely on state law classifications when assessing federal tax liabilities.

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