

### **3 T.C. 853 (1944)**

A distribution is considered a 'complete liquidation' of a corporation for capital gains tax purposes if it is part of a bona fide plan to cancel all stock within a specified timeframe, even if the corporation was previously under restrictions limiting new business.

#### **Summary**

Charles Manning, a shareholder of three joint stock land banks, disputed the Commissioner's assessment of his gains from distributions as short-term rather than long-term capital gains. The Tax Court addressed whether these distributions qualified as a 'complete liquidation' under Section 115(c) of the Internal Revenue Code. The court held that despite the banks operating under restrictions imposed by the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933, the subsequent formal plans of voluntary liquidation adopted by the stockholders were bona fide and the distributions qualified for long-term capital gains treatment. The court also held that legal fees incurred by Manning in a prior tax dispute were deductible as non-business expenses.

#### **Facts**

Charles Manning was a shareholder in three joint stock land banks: Kentucky, Dallas, and North Carolina. These banks, organized under the Federal Farm Loan Act, made farm loans and issued farm mortgage bonds. The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of 1933 restricted the banks from issuing new bonds or making new loans except for refinancing existing obligations. Despite these restrictions, the banks continued to manage existing loans, acquire farms through foreclosure, invest in government securities, and refund bonded debt. In 1938, 1940, and 1941, the stockholders of Kentucky, Dallas, and North Carolina banks, respectively, adopted formal plans of liquidation. Manning received distributions from these banks during 1939-1941.

#### **Procedural History**

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined deficiencies in Manning's income tax for 1939, 1940, and 1941, assessing the distributions as short-term capital gains. Manning petitioned the Tax Court for redetermination, arguing for long-term capital gains treatment and the deductibility of certain legal fees.

#### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether the distributions received by Manning from the joint stock land banks were received in complete liquidation under Section 115(c) of the Internal Revenue Code, thus qualifying for long-term capital gains treatment.
2. Whether attorneys' fees and legal expenses paid by Manning in 1939 related to prior tax litigation are deductible as a non-trade or non-business expense

under Section 23(a)(2) of the code, as amended by Section 121 of the Revenue Act of 1942.

## **Holding**

1. Yes, because the banks adopted bona fide plans of liquidation, and the distributions were made according to those plans within the specified timeframe for complete liquidation under Section 115(c).
2. Yes, because the legal fees were related to a prior transaction involving the sale of stock for profit, and thus were connected to the collection of income.

## **Court's Reasoning**

The court reasoned that despite the restrictions imposed by the 1933 Act, the banks were still privately owned corporations with the right to voluntarily liquidate under federal statute if they provided for their liabilities and obtained authorization from two-thirds of their stockholders. The Emergency Farm Mortgage Act did not mandate immediate liquidation or nullify the possibility of a later, formal voluntary liquidation plan. The court found the plans adopted in 1938, 1940, and 1941 were bona fide because the banks' officers and directors acted in good faith to manage the banks profitably during a difficult period, facilitating eventual liquidation. Since the plans explicitly provided for liquidation within a three-year period, and the distributions occurred within that timeframe, the court concluded the distributions qualified as 'amounts distributed in complete liquidation.' Regarding the legal fees, the court distinguished its prior ruling in *John W. Willmott*, noting that the original transaction (sale of stock) was for profit, therefore the related litigation expenses were deductible under Section 121. As the court stated, "Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation are deductible under section 121 of the Revenue Act of 1942 only when the subject matter of the litigation bears a reasonable and proximate relation to the production or collection of income or to the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for that purpose."

## **Practical Implications**

This case provides a framework for determining what constitutes a 'complete liquidation' for tax purposes when a company has operated under restrictions limiting its business activities. It clarifies that even if a company is essentially winding down its operations due to external constraints, a formally adopted plan of liquidation can trigger long-term capital gains treatment for distributions if the plan is bona fide and completed within the statutory timeframe. The case also illustrates that the origin of the claim determines deductibility of legal fees, not necessarily the outcome of the litigation itself. If the original action was for the production of income, then legal expenses are deductible.