

## **2 T.C. 542 (1943)**

Dividends paid to preferred stockholders according to the terms of the stock are not considered gifts from common stockholders, even if the common stockholders control the corporation.

### **Summary**

Leo Wallerstein contested a gift tax deficiency, arguing that dividends paid to preferred stockholders of Wallerstein Co. should not be considered gifts from him, a principal common stockholder. The Tax Court held that the dividends were not gifts. The court reasoned that the preferred stockholders had a contractual right to the dividends, and the common stockholders' control did not transform legitimate dividend payments into gifts. The court also addressed the issue of exclusions erroneously allowed in prior tax years for gifts of future interests, holding that these exclusions should be disregarded when calculating the gift tax rates for the current years, despite the statute of limitations on the prior years.

### **Facts**

The Wallerstein Co. was incorporated in 1926, with common stock held by Leo and Max Wallerstein, and preferred stock held by their wives and key employees (Graf and Stroller). The preferred stock paid a cumulative 7% dividend and also entitled the holders to additional dividends equivalent to those paid on common stock. Leo and Max gifted some preferred stock to their wives in 1931. In 1934 and 1935, the company reduced its common stock, thereby increasing the value of the preferred stock's participating dividend rights. In 1936 and 1937, the company paid substantial dividends to the preferred stockholders.

### **Procedural History**

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined a gift tax deficiency against Leo Wallerstein for 1936 and 1937, arguing that the dividends paid to the preferred stockholders constituted gifts from Wallerstein. Wallerstein appealed to the Tax Court.

### **Issue(s)**

1. Whether dividends paid to preferred stockholders, in accordance with the terms of the preferred stock, constitute gifts from the common stockholders who control the corporation.
2. Whether the increase in dividends to preferred stockholders due to a reduction in common stock in prior years constitutes a gift from common stockholders in the years the increased dividends were paid.
3. Whether exclusions erroneously allowed in prior tax years for gifts of future interests should be disregarded when calculating the gift tax rates for the current tax years, even if the statute of limitations has run on the prior years.

## **Holding**

1. No, because the preferred stockholders had a contractual right to the dividends under the terms of the stock, and the common stockholders' control of the corporation does not transform a legitimate dividend payment into a gift.
2. No, because if a gift occurred, it occurred in the years the common stock was reduced (1934 and 1935), not in the years the increased dividends were paid (1936 and 1937).
3. Yes, because the gift tax is calculated on a cumulative basis, and prior erroneous exclusions should be disregarded to determine the correct tax rate for current gifts, even if those prior years are now closed under the statute of limitations.

## **Court's Reasoning**

The court reasoned that the preferred stockholders had a legal right to the dividends as defined in the stock agreement. The court emphasized that "the legal ownership of corporate funds is in the corporation itself." The Commissioner's argument that the common stockholders' control made the dividends gifts was flawed because it presupposed the common stockholders would either deprive themselves of dividends or illegally declare dividends only for themselves, actions which the court deemed unlikely and subject to equitable review. Regarding the reduction of common stock, the court found that any potential gift occurred when the stock structure was altered, not when dividends were subsequently paid. Finally, citing *Lillian Seeligson Winterbotham*, the court determined that prior erroneous exclusions should be disregarded for calculating the correct tax rate, aligning with the principle that gift tax rates should be based on cumulative lifetime gifts.

## **Practical Implications**

This case clarifies that dividends paid in accordance with the terms of preferred stock are generally not considered gifts, even if the corporation is controlled by common stockholders. It highlights the importance of adhering to contractual obligations in corporate governance and provides a defense against gift tax claims when dividends are distributed according to pre-existing agreements. This ruling reinforces that the focus of the gift tax should be on actual gratuitous transfers and not on payments made pursuant to legitimate business arrangements. It also confirms that the IRS can consider past gifting history, even if those years are closed, to accurately determine the appropriate tax bracket for current gifts. The ruling also emphasizes the importance of understanding the terms of preferred stock agreements and corporate structures when analyzing potential gift tax implications.